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WHEN IS LYING ILLEGAL? WHEN
SHOULD IT BE? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL FALSE STATEMENTS ACT
STEVEN R. MORRISoN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

One can assess a law in a number of ways, and the lens
through which the assessment is done often determines the
results. The Federal False Statements Act, codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, is an excellent example of a law that produces widely
divergent results depending upon the lens used. These divergent
results suggest that section 1001 is in need of critical examination
and fundamental reform. Section 1001(a)(2) prohibits knowingly
and willfully "mak[ing] any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States."' This Article examines the
statute through a number of different lenses: the apparent plain
meaning of the law and court interpretations of it; the history of
section 1001(a)(2); the congressional intent informing it; questions
of its constitutionality based on vagueness and overbreadth; public
policy arguments for and against it; and theories of criminal law
(or lack thereof). The Article then addresses some solutions to the
issues raised.
As a result of these examinations, the short answer regarding
section 1001(a)(2) is that it likely is unconstitutional but has been
and will be found by courts to be constitutional; probably is not
applied in accord with its congressionally intended application;
carries with it serious negative public policy implications;
addresses, albeit poorly, the important interest the government
has in receiving truthful information; is in disaccord with most
theories of criminal law; and is troubling in light of the prevalence
of lying by most parties in the criminal justice system and by most
people in general. What emerges is a view of section 1001(a)(2) as
a haphazardly constructed law that relies only on prosecutorial
forbearance and discretion to prevent its abuse. Section 1001(a)(2)
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1. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006).
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is also, however, a law with a long history of addressing real and
specific problems in a narrowly tailored way. Even today, despite
its overbreadth, section 1001(a)(2) can be an important tool in the
prevention of false statements that negatively affect us all.
Section 1001(a)(2) has been the subject of numerous law
review articles. Most criticize the statute, 2 and a few support it.3
As will be seen below, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
upheld section 1001(a)(2), but a number of judges have expressed
concern. Justice Ginsburg has provided an effective challenge to
section 1001(a)(2)'s interpretation, 4 and in one five-to-four
decision, a dissenting Justice Rehnquist went so far as to call the
statute unconstitutionally vague.5
Surprisingly, only a few
commentators have followed suit.6 Section 1001(a)(2) persists as a
constitutional law that criminalizes an extremely broad spectrum
of false statements.7
2. E.g., Peter W. Morgan, The Underfined [sic] Crime of Lying to Congress:
Ethics Reform and the Rule of Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 177 (1992); Richard H.
Underwood, False Witness: A Lawyer's History of the Law of Perjury, 10 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215 (1993); Alexandra Bak-Boychuk, Comment, LiarLaws:
How MPC §241.3 and State Unsworn FalsificationStatutes Fix the Flaws in
the False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 453 (2005);
Giles A. Birch, Comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies
and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1273 (1990); Michael Gomez,
Comment, Re-Examining the False Statements Accountability Act, 37 HOUS. L.
REV. 515 (2000); Alan Heinrich, Note, Clinton's Little White Lies: The
Materiality Requirement for Perjury in Civil Discovery, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
1303 (1999); William J. Schwartz, Note, Fairness in Criminal Investigations
Under the Federal False Statements Statute, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 316 (1977);
William Safire, Fight It, Martha,N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2003, at A35."
3. Stephen Michael Everhart, Can You Lie to the Government and Get
Away with It? The Exculpatory-No Defense Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), 99
W. VA. L. REV. 687 (1997); Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely
Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False
Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157 (2001); Jeffrey L. God, Case Note, Demise of
the Little White Lie Defense-The Supreme Court Rejects the "ExculpatoryNo"
Doctrine Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2): Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805
(1998), 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 859 (1999).
4. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
5. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 76 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
6. William L. Anderson & Candice E. Jackson, Martha Down Under:
Kangaroos in the Courtroom, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUNDATION, Mar. 15,
2004, available at http://www.fff.org/comment/com0403i.asp (describing the
dangers of section 1001(a)(2) as a "vague and expansive" criminal law);
Morgan, supra note 2, at 198.
7. United States v. Arcadipane, 41 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (criticizing that
"section 1001(a)(2) [in and of itself] constitutes a blanket proscription against
the making of false statements to federal agencies . . . [t]he statute equally
forbids falsification of any . .. statement."); United States v. Connolly, 9 F.3d
1535, 1993 WL 499819, at *1 (1st Cir. 1993) (falsifying "statements can be
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What do we do with a statute that has been declared
constitutional and addresses an important government interest,
but whose constitutionality has been called into question and
which criminalizes a broad range of conduct-lying-that many
believe to be a part of human nature and society, and occasionally
justified? Is section 1001(a)(2) constitutional? Does its application
accord with its congressional intent? If the law is constitutional, is
it nevertheless a "bad" law? How can we determine whether this
or any law is "bad"?
Can an exploration of public policy
arguments, theories of criminal law, and the nature of lying in
society and the criminal justice system answer this question?
This Article explores these questions and concludes that
section 1001(a)(2) is in need of an overhaul, but is salvable. Its
core values retain legitimacy, but its breadth makes it an unwise,
if not illegal, statute. Limits ought to be imposed. A logical start
to the discussion is the statute itself and its history.
II. SECTION 1001(A)(2) CURRENTLY
This Article, as well as those articles cited throughout,
focuses on section 1001(a)(2), which states, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly
and willfully(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or,
if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as
defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.
If the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or
117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment imposed under
this section shall be not more than 8 years.8
A violation of section 1001(a)(2) occurs if the government
material [and thus criminal] even if they were ignored, never relied upon, or

never read by the agency"); Laura Perry & Stephanie Salek, False Statements
and False Claims, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 465, 472 (2008); Gomez, supra note 2,
at 517; Heinrich, supra note 2, at 1315.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Although not explored in this Article, the

terrorism sentencing enhancement is a controversial subject in its own right.
Enacted into law in 2004 (in Pub. L. 108-458, § 6703(a)), it has yet to be
substantially tested by the courts. The question of what false statements
"involve" international or domestic terrorism may be as vague as or more
vague than section 1001(a)(2).
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proves five elements: (1) a statement was made; (2) the statement
was false; (3) the statement was made with specific intent; (4) the
statement was material; and (5) there was government agency
jurisdiction.9 Only element (2) has never been one of contention,
although, as will be seen, it should be. Elements (1), (3), (4), and
(5) have been subjects of court interpretation and congressional
amendment. A lengthy judicial and legislative history surrounds
each of these elements and also results in controversy over their
meanings.
A preliminary concise overview of each element,
presenting their dominant interpretations as well as minority
positions, will be helpful.
(1) A statement was made. In 1998, the Supreme Court
rejected the "exculpatory no" doctrine.10 This doctrine had been
the law in a number of circuits and provided an exception to
criminal liability under section 1001(a)(2) for false statements that
consist merely of denial of wrongdoing." The Court rejected this
doctrine because the statute, by definition, includes 'any' false
statement-that is, a false statement 'of whatever kind."'1 2 Justice
Souter, concurring in part and in the judgment, expressed his
concern that Congress could not have meant to criminalize denials
of guilt.13 He went on to question whether Congress intended
section 1001(a)(2) to cover non-custodial, informal interactions
between government agents and their targets.14 A non-custodial
setting differs significantly because the suspect is not informed of
any of his rights. 15 Nor is he under oath and therefore he is
unlikely to weigh the importance of the veracity of his answers.' 6
Moreover, the purpose of section 1001(a)(2) was "to protect the
Government from the affirmative, aggressive and voluntary
actions of persons who take the initiative; and to protect the
Government from being the victim of some positive statement
which has the tendency and effect of perverting normal and proper
governmental activities and functions."' 7
A line of circuit court cases supports Justice Souter's view. A
First Circuit case, United States v. Chevoor,18 was overturned to

9. United States v. Jiang, 476 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1226 (11th Cir. 2007).
10. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 398.
11. Id. at 399, 401.
12. Id. at 400 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)).
13. Id. at 408 (Souter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
14. Id. at 410-11.
15. Id. at 411.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 413 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Paternostro v. United
States, 311 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1962)).
18. 526 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1976).
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the extent that it approved the "exculpatory no" doctrine.19
Beyond that, however, the Chevoor court acknowledged that other
courts struggle to fit F.B.I. questioning within the scope of section
1001(a)(2). 20 Further, courts have found that when the F.B.I. or a
United States Attorney initiates an interrogation, section
1001(a)(2) does not apply to any responses a defendant gives. 21
This is because the defendant is not under oath. 22 The questioning
takes place in an informal setting, and the "negative responses" do
not constitute a statement under section 1001(a)(2). 23 The First
Circuit and Justice Souter are not alone in this reasoning. 24
While the Supreme Court overturned Chevoor and other cases
as to their approval of the "exculpatory no" doctrine, it did not
address their language described above. The question of what
statements are prohibited should not, therefore, be put so easily to
rest by stating that any false statement of whatever kind is
prohibited by section 1001(a)(2).
Not only is the materiality
element supposed to limit what statements are prohibited (a
problem in itself, as will be seen), but it is possible that Congress
intended only certain types of statements to be prohibited,
whether they are material or not. This intent to limit the
application of section 1001(a)(2) will become apparent in the
discussion of the history of the statute. 25
(2) The statement was false. To my knowledge, no court or
Congress has questioned what it means for a statement to be false.
Based on the lack of interpretation, the dominant view seems to be
that everyone intrinsically knows what statements are "false"
19. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408.
20. Chevoor, 526 F.2d at 183.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 184.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1972)
(defendant's giving of a false name to an F.B.I. agent "was not within the class
of false statements that section 1001(a)(2) was designed to proscribe."); United
States v. Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 291-92 (D.D.C. 1974) ("Congress did
not intend that [section 1001(a)(2)] be applied to statements given to the F.B.I.
voluntarily and without oath or verbatim transcription during an interview
initiated by the Bureau in the course of a criminal investigation."); United
States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (a false statement to
the F.B.I. did not "pervert[ ] the true function of the [F.B.I]."); United States
v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 206 (D. Md. 1955) ("the legislative intent in the use
of the word 'statement' does not fairly apply to the kind of statement . .. where
the defendants did not volunteer any statement or representation for the
purpose of making claim upon or inducing improper action by the government
against others."); United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 89 (D.C. Colo. 1953)
(it is not a violation of section 1001(a)(2) "to intentionally fail to tell the truth
to any investigator of any agency of the United States" where one is "under no
legal obligation to speak.").
25. See infra § III (outlining the history of section 1001(a)(2)).
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statements for section 1001(a)(2) purposes and what statements
are "true." It is not casuistry, however, to question whether the
line between the two can always be seen so clearly. For example,
imagine that an F.B.I. agent visits your home. She asks you
whether you heard about a recent shooting on the news. You had
heard about it, and based on news reports, you know that the gun
involved was a .45-caliber handgun. The agent asks you if you
know a particular person. You reply, truthfully, that you do and
that he is a close friend. The agent asks whether that friend owns
any guns. You know that your friend owns only a .22-caliber rifle.
You also know that your friend was not involved in the shooting
because on the night in question, you were with him. You
correctly assume that the agent is searching for a shooter who
possesses a .45-caliber handgun. Wanting to be helpful to the
agent, you reply, "No, my friend owns no gun." Is this a false
statement? Consider the following observation.
David Nyberg discusses the notion of "purposive
communication." 26
He envisions such communication as a
continuum, with absolute truth on one end and bald-faced lying on
the other. Along the spectrum are situations that require a careful
use of information "for some purpose."2 7 Nyberg continues that
"purposeful communication" requires some type of deception. 28 He
argues that lying is merely a "special subset of deception" that
affects any message." 29
In other words, to effectively
communicate, people often need to engage in some form of
deception. This is not lying, but is a method of selecting facts and
making assumptions in order to provide the listener with the
information the speaker believes she needs or wants to receive. In
the example above, you literally deceived the F.B.I. agent, but
based on your interpretation of her questioning, you answered her
with the purpose of assisting her work. Is this a false statement?
According to section 1001(a)(2) case law, it most likely is.
Based on the way human beings communicate, however, the issue
of the statement's falsity is open to debate.30 Consider the
following situation: a person's religious beliefs compel him to
believe that no one actually "owns" anything, and that God
temporarily provides people with the things they need to survive.
An F.B.I. agent asks this person, "Does your friend own any guns."
26. David Nyberg, Noble Lies, Narrative Truths, and the Art of Voice:
Thoughts on Pragmatic Language and the First Amendment, 64 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1203, 1207 (1996).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1207-08.
29. Id.
30. See infra § VI (discussing the nature of lying in general and in the
criminal justice system).
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The person might answer in the affirmative, wanting to be helpful
to the agent. From his point of view, this would be a false
statement, but he knows what the agent is after and wants to help
her, so he engages in purposive communication. Alternately, he
may answer in the negative, thus making a truthful statement
from his point of view. When the agent, however, discovers that
his friend actually does possess a gun, she reports this section
1001(a)(2) violation to the prosecutor, who initiates criminal
proceedings against the man.
(3) The statement was made with specific intent. Under
section 1001(a)(2), it is illegal to knowingly and willfully "make[ ]
any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation." 31 Does this mean that to violate the law, one
must knowingly and willfully make (1) a statement that turns out
to be material and false; (2) a false statement that turns out to be
material; or (3) a materially false statement? In other words, must
one intend to make just the statement, or must one intend that the
statement made also be either false or material, or both?32 As of
yet, no case exists where the government has charged, much less
convicted, a defendant who believed her statement to be true. The
question that remains, therefore, is whether one must intend her
statement to be material to be criminally liable. 33
In Yermian, the Supreme Court looked to basic grammar
rules and concluded that the statute was written so that the terms
"knowingly and willfully" only refer to "false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements." 34 Therefore, the Court reasoned that
there was no language to suggest that intent is necessary to
violate the statute. 35
In other words, the Court in Yermian held that to be
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).
32. For example, assume a government agent asks an interviewee, "When
was the last time you saw your friend Jason?" You have seen him twice in the
last month. Three weeks ago, you saw him at a mutual friend's birthday
party, and last week you saw him at a local anti-war rally. Not wanting to
reveal that your friend engaged in perfectly legal behavior, but behavior that
you believe the agent would look at with suspicion, you tell the agent that you
last saw your friend at a birthday party three weeks ago. This statement is
clearly false, and you intended it to be false. To be sanctionable under section
1001(a)(2), must you have intended only to make the false statement, or must
you have also intended for the statement to be material? That is, must you
have intended that the agent be influenced in her decision making by the false
statement? See infra § IV(1) (discussing the mindset of the decisionmaker).
33. A statement is material if it "has a natural tendency to influence, or
was capable of influencing, the decision of the decision making body to which
it was addressed." United States v. Kungys, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
34. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 69.
35. Id.
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criminally liable, one need not intend the materiality, only the
falsity of the statement.3 6 Other courts have supported this
view.37 This is the dominant view. A "natural reading" of section
1001(a)(2), however, need not lead to this result. In Yermian's
dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that from the majority's
opinion, one does not know "what the congressionally intended
element of intent is."38

Other courts have drawn a conclusion different than the
Yermian majority. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has folded the
materiality and intent element together, describing the
materiality test as whether the false statement was intended "to
induce action or reliance by an agency of the United States."39 The
Second Circuit noted that in one capacity, section 1001(a)(2) was
designed to address the situation when a false statement was
intended to provoke an investigation by an agency, such as the
F.B.I., and in doing so, distract the agency from its official
function. 40 Requiring that the statements be "calculated" to
induce agency actions is tantamount to requiring that the
defendant intend the materiality. This is just as plausible of a
reading and a viable alternative to the Yermain holding.
This distinction is important because it places in dispute the
mens rea of the crime as shown by the very purpose of section
1001(a)(2), which is to ensure that the government does not act to
its detriment on false information. The majority view holds that a
false statement is illegal under section 1001(a)(2) even if the
statement-maker does not intend that the government rely on the
statement. For example, assume I.R.S. agents arrive at a family's
house unannounced. The parents' eighteen-year-old son answers
the door and, after a brief conversation, is asked if his parents
recently made any large purchases. The son is frightened and
does not want to say anything that would get his parents in
trouble. Although his mother recently purchased an expensive
painting, in the heat of the moment he tells the agents that his
parents have made no large purchases. If his knee-jerk reaction of
stating a falsehood contained any mens rea, it was to protect his
parents, not to induce the agents to rely on his false statement.
Given the unannounced visit and his fright, the son did not have
36. Id.
37. United States v. Jacobs, 212 F. App'x 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[t]he
government need not prove a specific intent to deceive nor that [defendant]
knew her conduct was unlawful."); United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020,
1029 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that intent requires "only a purpose to do the
forbidden act, not a specific intention or awareness that the act will mislead
the Government").
38. Yermain, 468 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. United States v. Silva, 119 F. App'x 892, 894 (9th Cir. 2004).
40. United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1967).
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time to consider the possible consequences of his statement on the
agents' future actions. He may have intended to make his false
statement, but it was not calculated to induce any governmental
action. Depending on the jurisdiction, the eighteen-year-old may
or may not be criminally liable under section 1001(a)(2).
(4) The statement was material. Before section 1001(a)(2)'s
amendment by Congress in 1996, materiality was not an explicit
element, even though most circuits considered it to be one.4 1 The
definition of materiality for purposes of section 1001(a)(2) was
articulated in a 1988 Supreme Court case Kungys v. United
States.42 In that case, the Court observed that a statement is
material if it "has a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable
of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it
[is] addressed." 43
Although the materiality amendment was Congress' attempt
to limit the application of section 1001(a)(2), 44 the materiality
element provides only a hollow promise.
The standard for
establishing materiality is quite low, 45 and its definition is
"extraordinarily loose" 46 such that it is vague. Terms such as
"natural tendency" and "capable of influencing" can mean largely
what anyone wants them to mean. Indicative of this are courts'
interpretations of the materiality standard: they have said that a
statement is material if it was "predictably capable" of affecting a
decision; 47 had a "natural and probable effect" of interfering with
government decisionmaking; 48 had a "propensity" to influence;49
"might have" influenced a government function;50 had the
"potential" to influence;5 1 and "could have" affected a decision. 52
To be material, then, must a statement be very likely, somewhat
likely, or merely possibly likely to influence a decisionmaker?
Stated another way, must the statement have a greater than 50%
chance of swaying a decisionmaker, or will a 1% chance suffice to
41. Perry & Salek, supra note 7, at 472; Bak-Boychuk, supra note 2, at 464.
42. Bak-Boychuk, supranote 2, at 465.
43. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771.
44. United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987); Chad B.
Pimental, False Statements, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 709, 716 (2001) (citing
United States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d 1148, 1151 (6th Cir. 1985)); Bak-Boychuk,
supra note 2, at 487-88.
45. Pimental, supra note 44, at 716; Heather L. Scanlon, False Statements,
39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507, 514 (2002); Gomez, supra note 2, at 524.
46. Morgan, supra note 2, at 234.
47. United States v. Turner, 551 F.3d 657, 663 (7th Cir. 2009).
48. United States v. Johnson, 485 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007).
49. Silva, 119 F. App'x at 894.
50. United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 234 (1st Cir. 1985)
(italics omitted).
51. United States v. Odunze, 278 F. App'x 567, 570 (6th Cir. 2008).
52. United States v. Richey, 279 F. App'x 779, 781 (11th Cir. 2008).

120

The John Marshall Law Review

[43:111

make the statement material?
Not only are courts split over the degree of a statement's
capability of influencing a decisionmaker necessary for liability,
but they also differ in terms of the nature of the statement. While
a number of courts adhere to the Kungys definition of materiality,
the Third Circuit in United States v. McBane seemed to break
away and establish an objectively "reasonable decisionmaker"
standard. 53 The court reasoned that the language in the statute,
specifically the phrase "natural tendency," connoted a standard
where liability is present only if the statement has the potential of
influencing a "reasonable decisionmaker." 54
Given the Kungys definition of materiality, the government's
concession in the first sentence should have resulted in a directed
verdict of not guilty. It did not, however, and McBane's analysis
has found favor in other courts. The Seventh Circuit quoted the
above passage at length and held that a false statement can be
material even if it does not actually influence agents; the
statement need only have potential to influence a "reasonable
agent under normal circumstances."55 The dilemma is whether
materiality is to be judged on an objective or subjective basis. The
Third and Seventh Circuits have adopted an objective approach,
whereas the Kungys definition of materiality indicates a subjective
approach, asking whether the actual statement made was capable
of influencing the actual government decisionmaker involved.
Even under the subjective approach, the materiality standard
does not effectively limit section 1001(a)(2). This is so because a
statement may be material even though the government never
sees,56 relies on,5 7 or believes5 8 the statement, and whether or not
the statement-maker knew the government was involved59 or even
made the statement to the government.6 0 These interpretations
suggest some troubling conclusions. For example, consider a
target of a federal investigation who, unbeknownst to him, is
53. United States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
54. Id. at 350-51.
55. Turner, 551 F.3d at 659.
56. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 30-31.
57. Turner, 551 F.3d at 663; United States v. Dwyer, 238 F. App'x 631, 649
(1st Cir. 2007); McBane, 433 F.3d at 350.
58. State v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1998); United States
v. LeMaster, 54 F.3d 1224, 1230 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Parsons, 967
F.2d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1992).
59. United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 297 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d
546, 553 (7th Cir. 1984).
60. United States v. Shafer, 199 F.3d 826, 829 (6th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Gibson, 881 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d
1322, 1326 (7th Cir. 1986).
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dealing with a confidential informant. The target makes a false
statement to the informant that, if received by the government
agency, could influence its decisionmaking. In the course of the
investigation, the informant never tells the agency of this false
statement, so the agency never hears it or relies on it. The target
At trial, the
is indicted on a non-section 1001(a)(2) charge.
confidential informant testifies to the defendant's false statement.
The prosecution might then be able to amend the indictment or
issue a new one, alleging a section 1001(a)(2) violation.
Indeed, one criticism of section 1001(a)(2) is that it is being
used to prosecute targets only when the government is unable to
prove an underlying charge.6 1 After a period of trying to prove an
underlying charge against the target described above, the
government might give up. It might then conduct a detailed
interview with the confidential informant, learning everything the
target said to the informant. In so doing, the government might
learn of a false statement the target made in the distant past and
declare months or years later that this statement, if it had been
received, could have influenced the agency. It could therefore
proceed against the target based on section 1001(a)(2).
Since 1996, when Congress made materiality an element, the
fact that the statement does not have to be made to the
government agent in question to be material has not been
challenged.
This is, however, an open question because the
Kungys definition of materiality has been altered by subsequent
courts. Kungys declared that a statement is material if it "has a
natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the
decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed."62
A number of courts have applied this definition,6 3 but others have
excluded the last five words from this definition, so that their
definition for materiality is a statement that "ha [s] a natural
tendency to influence or was capable of influencing the [agency]."64
The question, therefore, is this: if a section 1001(a)(2) indictment
alleges that the F.B.I. might have been influenced, must the

61. Safire, supra note 2, at A35 (complaining that Martha Stewart was
brought under section 1001(a)(2) when the government could not otherwise
prosecute her).
62. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 770 (emphasis added).
63. United States v. Rastegar, 472 F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (8th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Beltran, 136 F. App'x 59, 61 (9th Cir. 2005); McBane, 433
F.3d at 350; United States v. Ntreh, 142 F. App'x 106, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Finn, 375 F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 163 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Wheeler, 79 F. App'x
656, 663 (5th Cir. 2003).
64. United States v. Hames, 185 F. App'x 318, 324 (5th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Wintermute, 443 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Rashid, 383 F.3d 769, 778 (8th Cir. 2004).
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statement have been made to the F.B.I., or could the statement's
influence have reached the F.B.I. through some intermediary?
The Yermian Court, for example, upheld the conviction of a
defendant who had made a false statement to a private employer,
which had transmitted that statement to the Department of
Defense for appropriate security clearances. 65 The defendant
argued that he had no actual knowledge that his false statements
would be transmitted to a federal agency,66 and the Court held
that proof of this knowledge was not necessary for a conviction. 67
Does this mean that a false statement made to a confidential
informant who transmits that statement to the F.B.I. is
actionable? What if, in a moment of braggadocio, you falsely tell
your neighbor that you cheat on your taxes, and your neighbor
contacts the I.R.S., which then initiates an audit? Under the
Yermian analysis, these false statements would be criminal, but
under the Kungys definition, they would not be material and thus
not criminal. This contradiction suggests that section 1001(a)(2)
may be both over- and underinclusive. Yermian makes section
1001(a)(2) overinclusive because its analysis means that lies such
as the one to your neighbor may be criminal. Kungys makes
section 1001(a)(2) underinclusive because it would not make
criminal a serious false statement made to the F.B.I. that is then,
pursuant to F.B.I. policy, automatically transmitted to a U.S.
Attorney's office, which on the basis of the statement makes a
decision. Because the statement did not influence and was not
capable of influencing the F.B.I.-the agency to which the
statement was addressed-Kungys would hold that the statement
was not material, and thus not criminal. Neither of these
outcomes makes sense. A possible resolution to this is found in
United States v. Gaudin.68

In Gaudin, the Supreme Court held that materiality under
section 1001(a)(2) is a mixed question of law and fact to be decided
by the jury.69 The Court noted that the legal standard of
materiality (presumably to be decided by the court as a matter of
law) is its definition set forth in Kungys.70 It also, however, noted
that in order to determine if a statement is material, the court
must first ask and aswer two questions: (1) "what statement is
made?" and (2) "what decision was the agency trying to make?"71
Only after these questions are resolved can a court decide if a
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Yermian, 468 U.S. at 65-66.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 75.
See generally United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 509, 512.
Id. at 512.
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statement was material to the decision made, thus satisfying the
materiality standard. 72
The Court went on to find that materiality of a statement
depends on what inferences a "reasonable decisionmaker" would
make, given the exact same facts known to the party involved.7 3
After Gaudin, courts have uniformly ignored this enigmatic
analysis, preferring to apply the broad Kungys definition (or its
truncated version) however it suited them. But one case did
seriously consider the Gaudin formulation. In United States v.
Finn, the Tenth Circuit considered the case of Finn, a special
agent head up a government agency charged with fighting drug
and gun-related crimes around public housing. 74 Finn allegedly
had misused government funds for personal uses, and falsified a
government expenditure form in connection with the misuse.7 5 He
was charged under section 1001(a)(3).76
Finn argued that the form was incapable of influencing any
decision that the government agency was required to make.77 The
court applied the Kungys definition and the Gaudin analysis,7 8
and asked "what decision, if any [was] HUD ... trying to make in
connection with the case expenditure form at issue."79 The court
found that Finn had been allocated authority to determine the
propriety of expenditures, and so it would not be a reasonable
inference for a fact finder to infer that HUD could or would have
looked at the form in order to determine "the propriety of the
underlying expense or for any other articulated purpose."8 0
Finn thus suggests that the Gaudin analysis rejects the
objective analysis set forth in United States v. McBane and,
instead, stands for the proposition that the statement made must
be reasonably connected to the decision to be made.81 For
example, if the F.B.I. were investigating a gun-running operation
headed by John, and the F.B.I. asked John's neighbor Jane, "To
your knowledge, does John ever have guns in his apartment," and
Jane lies and says no, her lie ("John has no guns") is reasonably
connected to the decision to be made ("Do we investigate further
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Finn, 375 F.3d at 1034-35.
75. Id. at 1036-37.
76. Id. at 1037. The defendant was charged under 1001(a)(3) because he
submitted a false writing rather than making false oral statement. See 18
U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3) (finding an individual guilty if he uses a false writing or
document).
77. Finn, 375 F.3d at 1038.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1040.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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whether John runs guns?"). If, however, the F.B.I. intends to test
Jane's credibility, and, knowing that Jane frequents a local lesbian
club, the agents ask Jane, "Are you gay," Jane's lie that she is not
gay is not material. This is so because the statement made ("I'm
not gay") is not reasonably connected to the ultimate decision to be
made ("Do we investigate further whether John runs guns?").
The prosecutor, faced with F.B.I. agents who wanted to test
Jane's credibility, will argue that the decision to be made was
whether to continue interviewing Jane with the assumption that
she would answer truthfully. Although the statement made had
some connection to this decision to be made, it was not a
reasonable connection because people may be expected to lie to a
federal agent about their sexual orientation or proclivities. Based
on Gaudin, then, the question does not focus on which agency
receives the statement and which agency is ultimately potentially
influenced. Rather, the focus is on whether the statement made is
reasonably connected to the decision to be made, by whichever
government agency.

(5) There was government agency jurisdiction. This element is
quite settled by now. In the past, courts have limited jurisdiction
to only certain government agencies, 82 but in the 1996 amendment
to section 1001(a)(2), Congress did away with that limitation by
prohibiting false statements 'in any matter within the jurisdiction
of the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the Government of
the United States."'8 3 Now, section 1001(a)(2)'s jurisdiction covers
a false statement to any of the three branches of government. 84
The evolution of these five elements has brought section
1001(a)(2) to its current state. The law now covers any false
statement of whatever kind, made knowingly and willfully, that is
capable of influencing any government agent. The maker of the
false statement need not intend to deceive, and need not even
know that his statement will be received by a government agent.
Moreover, a government agent need never receive the statement
for it to be covered under section 1001(a)(2). The law therefore has
been called "broad,"85 malleable,86 "the flubber of all laws,"87
82. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 715 (1995) (overruling
United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), and holding that a federal
court is not an agency or department for section 1001(a)(2) purposes);
Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 365-66 (8th Cir. 1967) (stating that
the F.B.I.'s jurisdiction to investigate crimes is not the jurisdiction envisioned
under section 1001(a)(2)).
83. United States v. Butler, 351 F. Supp. 2d 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)).
84. Perry & Salek, supra note 7, at 474.
85. Id. at 467.
86. Todd S. Kurihara & Kenneth T. Whang, False Statements and False
Claims, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 491, 493 (2007).
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"notorious,"8 8 and a felony generator.8 9 Section 1001(a)(2) has not
always been so broad, or so controversial. For much of its history,
the law has narrowly addressed specific governmental needs.
Only in the last fifty years has it developed into a catch-all statute.
III. HISTORY OF SECTION 1001(A)(2)
A number of articles and legal opinions have recounted the
history of section 1001(a)(2). 90 Justice Ginsburg provided an
excellent summary in her Brogan concurrence.9 1 There are three
key themes in the statute's history: (1) section 1001(a)(2) as a
narrow, focused law vs. section 1001(a)(2) as a broad catch-all; (2)
section 1001(a)(2)'s vagueness; (3) and the intended purpose of the
statute.
The law that would become section 1001(a)(2) was passed on
March 2, 1863,92 and arose during the Civil War to protect the
federal government from a "spate of frauds" submitted by military
con artists scamming the United States War Department.98 It was
intended to punish fraud perpetrated on the federal government, 94
and so made it criminal to "present ... for payment . .. any claim
upon or against the Government of the United States."95 The law
prohibited the making of false statements "for the purpose of
obtaining ... the approval or payment of' a claim.96 The original
law, therefore, apparently required prosecutors to prove that a
defendant, by his false statement, intended to (1) defraud the
government and (2) thereby obtain financial benefit through his
fraudulent war benefits claim. The prohibition of the statute was
broad,97 but it was limited to statements related to filing claims
with the government.98
The Supreme Court has issued
contradictory interpretations of this statute. In Bramblett, the
Court held that the law's application was limited to military

87. Heinrich, supra note 2, at 1315.
88. Id.
89. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 409 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 412-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Hubbard v. United States, 514
U.S. 695, 704-08 (1995); Yermian, 468 U.S. at 76; Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 50408; United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 92-95 (1941); United States v.
Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1960); Green, supra note 3, at 191-93;
Morgan, supra note 2, at 199-214; Bak-Boychuk, supra note 2, at 456-58;
Gomez, supra note 2, at 518-20.
91. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410-11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
92. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 504.
93. Bak-Boychuk, supra note 2, at 456-57.
94. Id. at 457.
95. Hubbard,514 U.S. at 704.
96. Id. at 705; Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 505.
97. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 505.
98. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 412 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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personnel,99 but in Hubbard, the Court said that Bramblett's
analysis was wrong, and that the law covered acts by all people,
not just military personnel.10 0 At least one commentator has
Whatever the correct
supported Bramblett's interpretation.' 0'
to cover "every
extended
law
was
the
analysis was, in 1874
02
personnel.1
person," not merely military
Other than the 1874 amendment, the law remained
In that year, Congress
essentially unchanged until 1918.103
made "for the
false
statements
amended the statute to cover
and
swindling or
of
cheating
purpose of and with the intent
104
made
for
the
purpose of
not
just
"if
defrauding the Government,"
05
the
addition
of
Although
obtaining payment of a false claim."
an
have
indicated
might
the term "cheating and swindling"
intention to criminalize false statements for non-pecuniary
purposes, in 1926 the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Cohn that the law was limited to "cheating the government out of
property or money." 0 6 In addition, the Cohn Court held that to be
criminally liable, a person must have intended to cause the
"pecuniary or property loss."107
In 1995, the Hubbard Court
opined that while the scope of the 1918 amended language may
have been unclear, the purpose was again to protect the
government, this time from false statements made by successful
corporations post-World War I, trying to garner federal benefits.108
As the country moved into the 1930s and saw the advent of
numerous New Deal programs and agencies, it became clear that
the 1918 law's "restrictive scope" as interpreted in Cohn did not
cover many of these New Deal programs. 0 9 On the contrary,
government interests were crippled despite the fact that the
government was not "deprived of any property or money.""10
Up to 1934, the law prohibited false statements that were
made with the purpose of fraudulently obtaining monetary claims
against the government."' The two limiting elements in this
99. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 505.
100. Hubbard,514 U.S. at 704.
101. See Bak-Boychuk, supra note 2, at 457 (stating that the original section
1001 statute in practice applied only to military personnel).
102. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 70 n.8; Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 506 n.2.
103. Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 705.
104. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 412 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Yermian, 468 U.S.
at 70; Hubbard,514 U.S. at 705.
105. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 506 n.2.

106. United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 346 (1926); Gilliland, 312 U.S. at
92.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Cohn, 270 U.S. at 346-47; Yermian, 468 U.S. at 70.
Hubbard,514 U.S. at 706 (emphasis added).
Gomez, supra note 2, at 519.
Id.
Gilliland,312 U.S. at 92; Gomez, supra note 2, at 519.
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construction-that the defendant had to intend to deceive and
defraud the government, and that the purpose of the false
statement had to be to obtain a financial benefit-would prove
contentious.
However, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes presented a
draft bill to Congress that would have criminalized "the
presentation of a false written instrument relating to any matter
within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior,
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works, or Administrator of the Code of Fair Competition for the
Petroleum Industry."112 The House Judiciary Committee added
language that required that the government prove a specific intent
to defraud. 113 For this reason, President Roosevelt vetoed the
bill.114
Ickes sent Congress another draft that protected all
government agencies and did not require the government to prove
specific intent to defraud.115 The law then covered statements
made in "any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States."116 The specific intent element then
required the government to prove that the defendant had specific
intent to make a fraudulent or false statement. 1 7 This bill was
signed into law and effectively created the statute known today as
section 1001(a)(2).11s
The current law rejects the Cohn interpretation, instead
suggesting a "conscious choice" to expand the scope beyond
statements
made with specific
intent to defraud the
government. 19 Like the 1918 iteration, the 1934 version of the
law garnered criticism for its vagaries. The Hubbard Court found
that the new law could be interpreted in two different ways: (1) as
including new limitations, so that the statute only applied to
agencies of the Executive Branch (thus creating an essentially new
statute) or (2) as eliminating the "financial fraud requirement" but
nonetheless maintaining the breadth of the statute. 120 The Court
rejected the second interpretation despite lacking legislative
history that would indicate congressional intent to narrow the
scope of the statute.121
112. Morgan, supra note 2, at 202.
113. Id. at 205.
114. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 72; Morgan, supra note 2, at 205.
115. Morgan, supra note 2, at 205.
116. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 413 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Bak-Boychuk, supra
note 2, at 457.
117. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 72.
118. Hubbard,514 U.S. at 706.
119. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 71.
120. Hubbard,514 U.S. at 706.
121. Id.
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Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Yermian, challenged the
statute's clarity as to the required intent, arguing that it would be
unlikely that Congress intended to drastically alter the scope of
the statute, especially given the lack of legislative history
supporting that proposition. 122
The final significant event in the legislative life of section
1001(a)(2) took place in 1948, when the law was divided into two
separate sections. 123 One section prohibited false claims, and the
other prohibited false statements. 124 This amendment put the
statute into its modern form,125 except for the materiality element
which was added in 1996.126 Still, vagaries remain. The majority
of the Brogan Court held that section 1001(a)(2) makes punishable
"any" false statement "of whatever kind." 127 In her concurrence,
Justice Ginsburg had a different take. She wrote that the history
of section 1001(a)(2) demonstrates that the purpose was to protect
the government from affirmative fraudulent actions and from
being a "victim of some positive statement which has the tendency
and effect of perverting normal and proper governmental activities
and functions."128
The history of section 1001(a)(2) suggests the struggles that
Congress and the Court have had in formulating an effective,
intelligent, and clear law. With every iteration, Congress had
intended to create a law to address a specific problem confronting
the government, from con artists in the Civil War to those who
attempted to shirk their duties under New Deal regulations.
Perhaps because of the inherent difficulty in regulating lying in a
limited yet effective way, Congress passed laws that were at turns
The laws passed were open to
too broad and too limited.
interpretation, and the Supreme Court has wrestled with their
great breadth over the course of the statute's life. Congress has
attempted to address the law's vagaries, to little success. The final
attempt to clarify the law came in 1996, when Congress amended
the law to include the element of materiality. The definition of
materiality, however, is so broad and vague that it provides no
guidance or limitation. The law today is such that almost any
false statement may be actionable under section 1001(a)(2). Even
statements that never reach a federal agent may be criminal. Can

122. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. Morgan, supra note 2, at 208.
124. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 413 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
125. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 508 (noting that the 1948 amendment put
section 1001(a)(2) in present form).
126. See generally Pub. L. 104-292, § 2 (1996).
127. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 400.
128. Id. at 413 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Paternostro,311 F.2d at
302).
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this be what Congress intended? By its inclusion of a materiality
element, it is clear that Congress intended that some false
statements be prohibited, and some not be prohibited. Can the
legislative history help discern the line between criminal and noncriminal false statements?
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In enacting section 1001(a)(2) and its precursors, Congress
must have intended to limit its coverage to some lies only. This is
the reason that Congress requires a false statement to be material
if it is to be punishable. Given the all-encompassing definition of
materiality, however, section 1001(a)(2) is limitless because it
covers virtually any lie. This literal interpretation cannot be what
Congress intended. 129 How, then, did Congress intend to limit
section 1001(a)(2)?
One uncontroversial yet vague suggestion of intent is that
Congress enacted section 1001(a)(2) with the goal of protecting the
government from individuals who would "mislead it in the
administration of its programs."3 0 Put another way, Congress
intended that section 1001(a)(2) "protect the authorized functions
of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion
which might result from .. . deceptive practices," such as making
false statements. 131 Questions inevitably arise: what are the
"authorized functions" of an agency? What is "perversion"? For
example, is the F.B.I.'s authorized function to investigate and
detect crimes, 132 determine the truth or falsity of claims, 133 or,
more specifically, to investigate kidnappings and plots against the

129. See United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting) (deducing that a literal interpretation of section
1001(a)(2) is inappropriate); Bedore, 455 F.2d at 1110-11 (noting Congress
intended section 1001(a)(2) to only cover fraudulent claims against the
government and claims that interfere with authorized governmental
functions); Friedman, 374 F.2d at 366-67 (agreeing that the jurisdiction of
section 1001(a)(2) did not extend to F.B.I. investigations). Contra John
Poggioli, Note, Judicial Reluctance to Enforce the Federal False Statements
Statute in Investigatory Situations, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 515, 524-525 (1982)
(arguing that based on Supreme Court interpretation and statutory language,
Congress did not intend to limit the application of section 1001(a)(2)).
130. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 29.
131. United States v. Lambert, 470 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting
Gilliland,312 U.S. at 93).
132. See Friedman, 374 F.2d at 366 (examining the scope of section 1001 by
looking at the F.B.I's investigatory function); Davey, 155 F. Supp. at 178
(stating that the F.B.I.'s authorized function was to conduct investigations and
detect crimes).
133. See Lambert, 470 F.2d at 359 n.4 (concluding that it is the F.B.I.'s
primary function to determine the truth or falsity of a complaint).
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president?134 If it is to investigate and detect crimes, it may not be
a perversion of the F.B.I.'s function to make a false statement
because part of the F.B.I.'s job in investigating and detecting crime
is to evaluate the credibility of reports. If it is to determine the
truth and falsity of claims, then a statement that is false should
not pervert that function because the F.B.I.'s function depends on
the existence of false claims from which the F.B.I. can separate the
true ones. If it is to investigate a kidnapping, then a false report
of a kidnapping may pervert the F.B.I.'s functions. The answers to
these questions could, however, just as easily come out the other
way. If one gives false information, the F.B.I. would be hampered
in its goal of investigating and detecting crimes, as well as in
determining truth and falsity. If a person files a false kidnapping
report, the F.B.I.'s function may not be perverted because it is
charged not only with investigating kidnappings, but also with
determining whether a kidnapping actually occurred. The F.B.I.'s
function would therefore include determining the truth or falsity of
a kidnapping report. Based on the section 1001(a)(2) definition of
materiality, whether a false statement perverts an authorized
function of an agency is in the eye of the beholder.
What, then, can be said of Congress' intent? A review of the
Congressional Record suggests that Congress intended section
1001(a)(2) to cover false statements made (1) with a view toward
some financial benefit; 3 5 (2) by someone subject to government
regulation;1 36 (3) in documents required by law to be completed or
certified to be true; 137 (4) in connection with a violation of some
other law;138 or (5) with specific intent to defraud.139 Congress, it
seems, intended section 1001(a)(2) to apply to individuals who
have formal dealings with the government, in which they stand to
gain or lose something of value based on their statements. Section
1001(a)(2) is also intended to apply when people have more ad hoc
dealings with the government, for example when they have to
submit a one-time form, such as a tax form. In such cases,
Congress has expressed its intent to give fair warning that lying is
134. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 481 (1984) (noting that the
F.B.I. has an authorized function to protect the president).
135. See 153 CONG. REC. S4912-02 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2007) (reviewing
regulations that subject participants in governmental spending program to
section 1001 for falsifying application forms); 151 CONG. REC. H7043-01 (daily
ed. July 28, 2005).
136. 152 CONG. REC. H3822-04 (daily ed. June 13, 2006).
137. 151 CONG. REC. H9077-01 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2005); 145 CONG. REC.
S4257-02 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1999); 137 CONG. REc. S17044-02 (daily ed. Nov.
19,1991).
138. 151 CONG. REC. H7043-01 (daily ed. July 28, 2005).
139. 150 CONG. REC. S9813-02 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2004); 135 CONG. REC.
H9253-01 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989).
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a crime under section 1001(a)(2).
The problem with asserting this view of congressional intent
is that it is at odds with section 1001(a)(2)'s very broad language.
Congress may recognize that the statute can be literally applied in
a way that goes far beyond its intent. It has, moreover, trusted
the Department of Justice to be forbearing in its section 1001(a)(2)
prosecutions. A congressional task force noted that internal DOJ
policy mandates that a person be prosecuted under section
1001(a)(2) only if it is clear that the false statements were
deliberately intended to "conceal improper or illegal conduct." 140
Therefore, charges should only be brought when it can be shown,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statement was "made
knowingly and willfully." 14 1 The congressional task force therefore
presumed that the DOJ would only pursue criminal violations in
. . ."the most egregious cases" where the false statement was
intended to hide an illegal act.142
It is Congress' intent, therefore, to exclude "trifles" from
section 1001(a)(2)'s coverage. 143 Also Congress certainly does not
intend section 1001(a)(2) to be a crime manufacturer 44 or a
"gotcha" statute. Justice Ginsburg best summarized Congress'
intent when she wrote that section 1001(a)(2) is intended to
capture those individuals who take the initiative in attempts to
harm the government. 145 Congress could not have intended to
grant the Executive branch such broad powers "so that even
"unsworn statements to investigative officials" could be
criminal. 146 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court can interpret the
literal text of a statute more broadly than Congress intended it.47
The Court has done just this with section 1001(a)(2), thereby
making a statute of extensive breadth and vagueness and raising
serious constitutionality questions.
V. VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH

A statute is void for vagueness when it forbids certain actions
140. 135 CONG. REC. H9253-01 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Corsino, 812 F.2d at 30 (noting that courts exclude trifle claims
under section 1001 by requiring a materiality element to each claim).
144. Gomez, supra note 2, at 550-51 (arguing that it was not Congress'
intent to allow section 1001 to create criminal offenses from innocent conduct).
145. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 413 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Goldfine,
538 F.2d at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that section 1001
requires a willful intent to falsely influence the mind of a governmental body).
146. Friedman,374 F.2d at 366-67.
147. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that a
court can conclude the text of a statute to be applied more broadly than what
Congress initially intended).
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in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at the statute's meaning and differ as to its
application.14 8 Essentially, a statute must put a "person of
ordinary intelligence" on notice that it prohibits specific conduct. 149
In 1984, Justice Rehnquist complained that section 1001(a)(2)
was "ambiguous" especially since its language and legislative
history provided no substantial insight into Congress' intent. 150
Justice Rehnquist's complaint has been buttressed by the
argument that the scope or interpretation of the statute has not
been made clearer despite prosecutions, DOJ guidelines,
legislative history and case law. 151 The law was essentially "openended as to what deceptions in the years ahead will and will not be
prohibited." 1 5 2 The statutory addition in 1996 of the materiality
element (which a number of circuit courts had already established)
was intended to limit and define section 1001(a)(2). The broad and
vague definition of materiality, however, did not allow this. As the
law stands today, a wide range of false statements may be
criminal. Consider the following situations.
Richard works for an aerospace defense company, for which
he needs government security clearance. In his job application, he
is asked whether he has ever taken any illegal drugs. He answers
"No," even though once, in college, he tried marijuana. This job
application and all the others submitted to the company are
subject to random audits by government agents. A "yes" answer to
the drug question could cause the agents to initiate an
investigation or deny the applicant a security clearance. The
government never performs an audit that includes Richard's
application, so it never sees or relies on his false statement. This
false statement, if discovered, could be criminal under section
1001(a)(2).153

148. See generally United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); United
States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 374 (1978) (quoting Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
149. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
150. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 76-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ladner
v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)).
151. Morgan, supra note 2, at 187.
152. Id.
153. See United States v. Wilkins, 308 F. App'x 920, 926-27 (6th Cir. 2009)
(stating that "the government was not required to show that the form itself
went to HUD in order to establish that the false information on the form was
material."); Connolly, 1993 WL 499819, at *1 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that
false "statements can be material [and thus criminal] even if they were
ignored, never relied upon, or never read by the agency."); Corsino, 812 F.2d at
31 ("[s]tatements may be material even if ignored and never read by the
agency."); Daniel Engelberg, False Statements, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 545, 552
(2004) (explaining that "[t]he agency need not have actually believed or even

2009]

A CriticalAnalysis of the FederalFalse Statements Act

133

Lindsay is hosting a summer block party. She is speaking
with her neighbor Jim, who is an administrative assistant at the
Social Security Administration. Jim knows that Lindsay's father
qualifies for social security benefits and, knowing the father is
destitute, believes he needs these benefits desperately. He asks
Lindsay whether her father gets social security benefits. Lindsay
responds, with dismissive boldness, that her father does not get
benefits and is doing just fine without them. Something in the
way Lindsay answered Jim's question makes him suspect that
Lindsay or her father are engaging in fraud. In fact, Lindsay
knows her father receives benefits, but she lies to Jim because her
father is ashamed that he has to rely on the government for
support. The next day at work, Jim informs his supervisor of his
suspicions, and the administration initiates an investigation. The
investigation concludes that Lindsay's father is receiving only the
benefits he is entitled to. Lindsay's false statement may be
criminal under section 1001(a)(2). 154
Jay runs numbers for a local mob crew. One of his regular
customers is Janice. Unbeknownst to Jay, Janice was recently
arrested by the F.B.I. for transporting women across state lines for
the purpose of prostitution. To obtain a good disposition, she goes
to work for the F.B.I. as a confidential informant against the local
mob. Her first target is Jay. During their next meeting, Janice
asks Jay who in the mob he normally deals with as a numbers
runner. Jay reports to Hank but, not wanting to reveal anything
about the crew, Jay lies and says he reports to Mike. Janice tells
the F.B.I. this information. The agents begin to construct a
hierarchy of the crew and place Mike and Hank in positions based
on the false information Janice gave to them.
Jay's false
statement could be prohibited under section 1001(a)(2).15 5
Andy is a good friend of Matt. The I.R.S. is investigating
Matt for tax evasion. An I.R.S. agent is assigned to interview
Andy to find out whether Matt owns any boats, airplanes, or real
estate. In the course of his assignment, the agent learns that
Andy frequents a certain bar where gay men tend to congregate
and is, in fact, homosexual. The agent approaches Andy at his
received the false statement for the materiality requirement to be met.").
154. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 81 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that one
interpretation of section 1001(a)(2) would "extend the scope of the statute even
to reach, for example, false statements privately made to a neighbor if the
neighbor then uses those statements in connection with his work for a federal
agency.").
155. Id. at 69-70 (finding section 1001(a)(2) does not require actual
knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction); Wright, 988 F.2d at 1038 (stating
false statements need not be made directly to federal agency to be within its
jurisdiction); Gibson, 881 F.2d at 322 (holding there is no implicit requirement
that statement be made directly to federal department or agency).
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worksite and asks him a number of innocuous questions about
Matt and other of Andy's acquaintances. Midway through the
interview, the agent asks Andy if he is gay. Andy, not wanting to
share the truth with the agent or his co-workers, who are nearby,
lies. As a result of this false statement, the agent concludes that
he cannot trust any other answers Andy gives and, therefore, stops
the interview. This false statement may be prohibited under
section 1001(a)(2). 156
The First Circuit has held that the statute is "a blanket
proscription against" any false statement to a government agency
in any context, whether or not the citizen is required to tell the
truth . ... "157 This cannot be what Congress intended. The
addition of the materiality element alone suggests that Congress
intended some false statements (those that are material) to be
prohibited, and some (those that are not material) not to be
prohibited.
The history of section 1001(a)(2) and the
Congressional Record provide a rough sketch of the border
between the two types of false statements. Instead of mapping out
this border, court opinions have erased it and have declared that
virtually any false statement is prohibited. In the statute's
current form, a person of ordinary intelligence does not have fair
notice of which statements are forbidden and which are allowed.
Section 1001(a)(2) is an exemplary vague statute.
Conversely, one could say that section 1001(a)(2) is crystal
clear: it prohibits making false statements in a way that could
influence a federal agency. Citizens should feel a moral obligation
to tell government investigators the truth because "it is the right
thing to do."158 If section 1001(a)(2) is clear in this way, then it is
also overbroad. 159 Courts have never held that overbreadth of a
statute outside the First Amendment realm is grounds for the
statute's invalidation.160 The First Amendment does have some
applicability here, however, if only as a jumping off point to
discussing public policy, criminal law theory, and the role of lies in

156. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969) (noting that a
defendant does not have a privilege to lie in response to a question that the
government has illegally asked); Diane H. Mazur, Sex and Lies: Rules of
Ethics, Rules of Evidence, and Our Conflicted Views on the Significance of
Honesty, 14 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 679, 721 (2000) (asking
"[s]hould some 'sexual lies' be characterized as assertions of privacy rather
than as breaches of honesty?").
157. Arcadipane,41 F.3d at 5.
158. Everhart, supra note 3, at 719.
159. Morgan, supra note 2, at 189 (exemplifying the broad scope of section
1001 by examining scenarios of intra-governmental deception).
160. United States v. Wilkinson, 626 F. Supp. 2d 184, 188 (D. Mass. 2009);
State v. Neuman, 683 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2009).
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the criminal justice system and society in general.161 The precise
question though is whether it makes practical or theoretical sense
to criminalize virtually all false statements made to the
government.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY
Courts have clearly stated that public policy considerations
are the province of the legislature, 162 and that courts should not
and cannot make rulings based on public policy. On the other
hand, it is clear that public policy does play a role in judicial
decisionmaking 63 and has been instrumental in the development
of American common law. 164 Although judges cannot explicitly
base their decisions on public policy, legal opinions and opinions
about what is right for society (however that is defined, and by
whomever) are intertwined.165
If section 1001(a)(2) satisfies
congressional intent and legislative history, and is constitutional
and not vague, it is still an extremely broad statute. It needs,
therefore, to be evaluated in ways that will reveal whether it is a
wise statute.
This question can be answered by first summarizing the
arguments for and against section 1001(a)(2). The next logical

161. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, I suggest that section
1001(a)(2) shares a link to the First Amendment that other statutes do not
share because section 1001(a)(2) prohibits lies which have, on occasion, been
the subject of First Amendment protection. Bill Haltom, The Constitutional
Right to Lie, 43-NOV TENN. B.J. 32 (2007); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where's the
Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation of Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091
(2008); Nyberg, supra note 26.
162. Kentucky Retirement Systems v. E.E.O.C., 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2378-79
(2008); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 752-53 (2006); Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ala v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Illinois v. McArthur, 531
U.S. 326, 338-39 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyatt, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1476 (2009); Pasquantino
v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 379 n.8 (2005).
164. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 178-79 (2007) (citing
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352 (1928)); JOSHUA M. DUNN,
COMPLEX JUSTICE: THE CASE OF MISSOURI V. JENKINS 183 (The University of
North Carolina Press 2008); Michael Quinn, Do (Or, May) Insurance Defense
Lawyers Also Represent the Defending Insureds, 797 PLIiLIT 85, 112 (2009);
Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution, the Courts and the Common Law, 53
WAYNE L. REV. 153, 159 (2006); Jeffrey A. Gruen, Comment, Unconstitutional
Mixing of Religion and the Judiciary: An Analysis of the Fugitive State
Surrender Program Under Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 38 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1533, 1562 (2008).
165. Van De Camp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2009); Baze v. Rees, 128
S. Ct. 1520, 1541-42 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring); CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1965-66 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Michael
A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful"Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1531 (2007).
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step is to discuss section 1001(a)(2) as it pertains to a particularly
controversial field, that of statements made in the course of
criminal investigations. Finally, Sissela Bok, a philosopher who
has written a seminal text on lying, which is often quoted by legal
commentators, is relevant to this discussion. These theories must
be put into context of current public policy arguments. This
dialogue of how section 1001(a)(2) affects one field of statementmaking will aid in proposing a framework for understanding
whether section 1001(a)(2) is a wise or unwise law.
Stephen Michael Everhart provides perhaps the most direct
and simple support for section 1001(a)(2): "[c]itizens should tell
government investigators the truth. It saves time. It saves
money. And it is the right thing to do. . . ."166 His support of
section 1001(a)(2) seems to come from a moralistic standpointtelling the truth is "the right thing to do." In supporting section
1001(a)(2) as he does, he dismisses the complaint that most people
are not aware of 1001(a)(2)'s prohibitions1 67 and instead believes
that the fear that section 1001(a)(2) will be used to punish trivial
lying is already addressed by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against extreme punishment for minor conduct.168
Stuart P. Green offers similar broad support for section
1001(a)(2) because the false statements it prohibits are those that
promote "obviously harmful or risk-producing conduct, and ...
[are] uncontroversially subject to criminal sanctions."16 9 It seems
to be common sense, however, that not all lies-even material
ones-are harmful or risk producing, and as this Article shows,
section 1001(a)(2)'s prohibitions are anything but uncontroversial.
Alexandra Bak-Boychuk, although critical of section
1001(a)(2) herself, notes that as section 1001(a)(2) has evolved,
some "judges, lawyers, and academics have viewed it as ... an
innocuous and flexible tool for law enforcement . . . ."17o Jeffrey L.
God is one of these academics and supports section 1001(a)(2)
because it "has become one of the most effective weapons in the
arsenal of investigative techniques to insure the integrity of these
federal investigations."17 1
Those who support section 1001(a)(2), then, justify it on
grounds of morality (telling the truth is the right thing to do),
necessity (making false statements is dangerous), and expediency
Each of these
(section 1001(a)(2) helps law enforcement).
easily
be
dismantled.
supporting arguments can
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Everhart, supra note 3, at 719.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 693.
Green, supra note 3, at 159.
Bak-Boychuk, supra note 2, at 478.
God, supra note 3, at 859.
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As to morality, it is a platitude-however true-that telling
the truth is a good thing. When considering making lying a crime,
however, absolute moral truths must combine with realism and
lenity to produce statutes that answer to norms of morality as well
as the goal of the law to maximize both public safety and liberty.
In other words, outlawing all lies told to whomever might address
a moral imperative, but would wreak havoc on the type of society
Americans tend to desire.
The arguments against section
1001(a)(2), most of which are based on the belief that the law is
overbroad, suggest why section 1001(a)(2) may go beyond the
requirements of morality and threaten the type of society
Americans want.
As to necessity, it is doubtful that making false statements is
always, or even often, dangerous. False statements may slow
down government agencies in their work, and at worst they may
produce a level of fraud and financial loss. There has been no
case, however, in which anyone was physically, mentally, or
emotionally harmed because of a false statement made in violation
of section 1001(a)(2). Given the harm (or lack thereof) that false
statements can produce, we should ask what we are willing to pay
for the elimination of that harm. A democratic and free society
such as ours is slow and expensive precisely because it is
democratic and free. We like the fact that in any number of
situations, we are free to lie. The question should not be,
therefore, whether all false statements are dangerous but what we
(as society) are willing to give up in return for requiring, by law, a
certain extent of truthful statements. As the law prohibits an
increasing number of false statements, society will be required to
pay more. Society will have to pay for more extensive police work,
more cases in the judicial system, and more individuals
incarcerated or on probation. And society will have to pay with its
current intangible freedom to make false statements in a number
of situations.
As to expediency, the same argument holds. Due to the belief
that crime harms society, it is preferable to give law enforcement
authorities all the tools necessary to adequately discover,
investigate, and prevent crime. Physical, emotional, and financial
harms are all properly the subject of criminal sanction. False
statements made that induce these harms can also legitimately be
punished. The question is not, however, whether to punish acts
that contribute to these harms because society generally agrees
that prevention of these harms is a proper goal of the criminal
justice system. The question is how far outside this core goal of
harm prevention do we want to go in criminalizing acts? For
example, a false statement made merely to protect a friend may
not ultimately be harmful. A false report of a kidnapping made to
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the F.B.I., when the reporter really just wants the F.B.I. to find his
estranged wife, may cause additional work, but probably is not
"harmful" in the traditional sense. Truthful information helps
government to be more efficient. And we want an efficient
government, but not at an excessive cost. Furthermore, we place
all sorts of limits on law enforcement as shown by limits on police
officers in their ability to search places and speak to suspects.
Does section 1001(a)(2) satisfy the limits we want to place on
making false statements?
Justice Ginsburg suggested that section 1001(a)(2)'s
incredible breadth "empowers government officers with authority
'. . . to generate felonies."' 72 It is viewed by many as a way to trap
the defendant. 173 An officer can casually withdraw a false
statement, and is then guaranteed of some type of conviction even
if proving the underlying substantive crime fails.174 Additionally,
it may be "use[d] ... to beef up a weak indictment."175
Not only is section 1001(a)(2) criticized for reflecting an
overcriminalized state, but also for contributing to that state. 7 6
The underlying problem leading to these criticisms is that section
1001(a)(2) is incredibly broad and tends to mean whatever the
beholder wants it to mean.1 77 This overbreadth invites abuse178
and provides too much discretion to prosecutors.179 Although the
DOJ at one point signaled that it would undertake section
1001(a)(2) prosecutions only in aggravated cases,18 0 there is little
or no statutory limit to prosecuting only such cases. Thus, there is
a legitimate concern that section 1001(a)(2) has come to be and
will continue to be applied to situations that Congress did not
intend. The most problematic aspect of section 1001(a)(2) today is
its application to criminal investigations. 181 Such an application
may chill citizens' willingness to aid investigations,182 and it also
may violate congressional intent.
As described above, Congress likely intended section
1001(a)(2) to apply to active, positive, and aggressive lies made to
the government, at the statement-maker's initiation, in order to
172. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 409 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 409, n.1.
174. Id.
175. Safire, supra note 2.
176. Morgan, supra note 2, at 191.
177. Heinrich, supra note 2, at 1315.
178. Morgan, supra note 2, at 226.
179. Perry & Salek, supra note 7, at 467-68.
180. 135 CONG. REC. H9253-01 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989).
181. Birch, supra note 2, at 1273.
182. Friedman, 374 F.2d at 369; Everhart, supra note 3, at 692. But see
Lambert, 470 F.2d at 360 (arguing that the individuals will not stop
themselves from aiding in investigations).
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obtain some benefit. The language of the statute can be read to
apply to a greater range of false statements, and Congress has
been content to let the DOJ decide how far to take section
1001(a)(2). There must be some limit, however, and section
1001(a)(2)'s application in criminal investigations is particularly
relative.
A number of courts have questioned and rejected section
1001(a)(2)'s application in criminal investigations. They note first
that courts historically have had difficulty in extending section
1001(a)(2) coverage to criminal investigations, 183 although they
have done so on different grounds. 184 The basis for denying this
extension is the statute's legislative history or congressional
intent. The Ninth Circuit held that the legislative history of
section 1001(a)(2) makes it clear that section 1001(a)(2) is not
enacted in order to encompass all false statements; rather, only
those that may corroborate a fraudulent claim against the
Government or statements that could "pervert or corrupt the
authorized functions of those agencies to whom the statements
were made."185 Other courts have seconded both the "claims" and
In prefacing its use of both
the "perversion" arguments.
arguments to reject section 1001(a)(2)'s coverage of criminal
investigations, the Eighth Circuit first railed against section
1001(a)(2)'s breadth, concluding that it would be unthinkable that
Congress intended for unsworn false statements to government
investigators to carry a more severe punishment than perjury.186
Further, the Eighth Circuit cautioned that such a literal
interpretation would give police officers "sweeping power."187 If
Congress intended such a result, then it could have used "clear,
direct and positive terms."1 88
The court went on to argue that the "total view of the case
law" supported its position, and that a reading of cases indicates
four categories of section 1001(a)(2) prosecutions: (1) giving of false
information in order to receive monetary or proprietary benefit; (2)
resisting of monetary claims by the government by presentation of
false information; (3) seeking of some governmental privilege such
as employment or security clearance on the basis of falsified
information; and (4) giving false information which frustrates
lawful regulation. 189

183. Chevoor, 526 F.2d at 183; Friedman, 374 F.2d at 369; Ehrlichman, 379
F. Supp. at 292.
184. Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. at 292.
185. Bedore, 455 F.2d at 1111.
186. Friedman,374 F.2d at 366.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 367.
189. Id. at 368.
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Other courts have relied on the perversion argumento9 0 or the
notion that false statements made to the F.B.I. are not
"statements" for the purpose of section 1001(a)(2).191 Although
neither of these arguments sound very convincing on their surface
(doesn't false information pervert the F.B.I.'s function of
discovering the truth, and doesn't the word "statement" have an
obvious meaning?), courts' rationales provide more traction. For
example, courts have held that a statement made merely in
response to government-initiated questioning is not a section
1001(a)(2) "statement."192
Although most courts have been content to give section
1001(a)(2) a very broad interpretation that can easily extend its
coverage to criminal investigations, there is a legitimate
counterargument that should give courts pause. These cases
admonish courts to carefully consider congressional intent and not
merely apply the broad plain language of the statute. It is not an
easy task because Congress has been unable to clarify the law, and
courts are reluctant to create boundaries to broadly-worded laws,
lest they take on a less judicial and more legislative role. To effect
congressional intent, however, either Congress needs to clarify the
law or courts need to continue to wrestle with the issue. They
have been doing so since the early twentieth century. As a
resolution to section 1001(a)(2)'s problems is not apparent, the
twenty-first century should see more judicial action regarding
section 1001(a)(2).
Among legal scholars who deal with the issue of lies in the
law, Sissela Bok has provided the seminal text. 193 Her thoughts
can illuminate the propriety of section 1001(a)(2) and suggest
where we might want to draw the line between criminal and noncriminal lies.
Bok begins by defining a lie as "any intentionally deceptive
message which is stated."194
Easily enough said, and
uncontroversial, but she notes that lying is a difficult concept to
explore and evaluate19 5 for a number of reasons. Lying, writes
Bok, pervades every aspect of our lives, especially in the law. 196
Furthermore, lying is ethically acceptable in some cases. 197
Finally, she notes that sometimes an individual may want to lie in
190. Davey, 155 F. Supp. at 178; Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 205.
191. Chevoor, 526 F.2d at 184; Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 194.
192. Chevoor, 526 F.2d at 183-84; Bedore, 455 F.2d at 1111; Ehrlichman, 379
F. Supp. at 291-92; Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 193-94, 205-06.
193. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE

(Vintage Books 1999) (1978).
194. Id. at xxiii, 13 (emphasis in original).
195. Id. at xxviii, 119.
196. Id. at xxix, xxviii, 242.
197. Id. at xxx, xxxiii, 45.
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order to gain power, 9 8 avoid betraying a friend, 99 prevent some
action from occurring, get out of a scrape, save face, or avoid
hurting another's feelings. 200
What lies should be legally
acceptable, and what lies should not?
Bok believes that in general, we should not lie. 201 Lies should
be given an initial negative weight, and when in any situation a lie
is a possible choice, one should first seek truthful alternatives. 202
Only when a lie is a last resort should one even consider whether
or not the lie is justified. 203 This is so because lies harm
individuals immediately and harm society in the long run through
the erosion of trust and cooperation. 204 The question, therefore, is
the difficult one of drawing the line between acceptable and
unacceptable lies. 205
Bok proposes a number of factors to consider in evaluating
the propriety of a lie. The first is the consequences of the lie. 206
The evaluation should also consider the excuses people make for
their lies and the principles to which they refer when explaining
why they lied. 207 Bok mentions four principles for lying, which can
also be considered excuses: the lie was made in order to (1) avoid
harm; (2) produce a benefit; (3) ensure fairness; or (4) promote
veracity (by, for example, telling one lie to undo another). 208 Other
factors that Bok would consider are the degree to which the
deceived person was expecting to hear the truth; the rules by
which people communicate (perhaps there has been an explicit
allowance for deception or, on the contrary, deception was clearly
ruled out); the relationship between the liar and the deceived; the
existence of a contract between the parties; the power relationship
between them; the awareness of the liar to alternatives to lying;
and the ingenuity of the liar. 209 Based on these factors, Bok's
198. Id. at 22-23.
199. Id. at 40.
200. Id. at 20.
201. Id. at 30-31.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 31.
204. Id. at 19, 24.
205. Id. at 46, 119.
206. Id. at 46.
207. Id. at 54.
208. Id. at 76, 84.
209. Id. at 87-88. Orson Welles' 1975 film F for Fake illustrates well these
factors and their interaction with each other. Welles narrates this film and
appears at its beginning. The film explores the border between truth and
illusion and, more immediately, concerns the renowned art forger Elmyr de
Hory and de Hory's biographer Clifford Irving, who also wrote a false
biography of Howard Hughes. At the outset of the film, Welles promises the
viewer that for one hour, he will be entirely truthful. His ability to tell a story
so that the viewer is thoroughly enchanted makes us forget his promise. For
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question is whether a practice of telling lies in some contexts may
not be harmful. 210 While she approaches the question from an
ethical standpoint, our question is whether we can adequately
describe which lies should be criminal, and which lies should not
be criminal.
Bok's factors suggest at least four considerations that should
be made regarding section 1001(a)(2). First, should there be room
to consider the mindset of the hearer of the lie? For example,
should the lie be criminal if the hearer knows that it is a lie?
Second, should the fact that lying is prevalent in both society and
the criminal justice system play a role in reforming or evaluating
Third, should a defendant have excuses
section 1001(a)(2)?
available as a defense? If so, what might acceptable excuses be?
Finally, can we construct a continuum of lies and determine where
on the continuum the border between criminal and non-criminal
lies should be set?
(1) Should there be room to consider the mindset of the hearer
of the lie? Current law holds that even if the government agent

knows that the statement she hears is untrue, the statement
maker may still be criminally liable. In addition, even if the agent
never hears the lie, is not deceived, or does not rely on the
statement, the statement-maker may still be liable. In these
situations, the mindset of the government agent was such that the
false statement had little or no adverse effect. These situations
are akin to attempted crimes: one may attempt an assault, but not

succeed. Section 1001(a)(2) is different, however, because one
either makes the false statement or one does not; the actual
consequence of the false statement is largely immaterial. One
cannot, under current law, attempt to make a false statement and
thereby be guilty of a crime. This is so because there is no
requirement that the false statement actually deceive any agent or
cause any harm. It is the making of the statement alone that
makes one criminally liable.
Should this be the case? Should we expose people to criminal
liability for a lie that does not produce any harm? A number of
crimes of attempt do just that, and we tend to agree that, for
example, attempted murder should be punishable as a crime. We
agree with this because the consequences of the act, if carried to
fruition, are so severe that we need to punish the mere attempt.
There is no case law in which a section 1001(a)(2) violation came
close to causing such harm. In fact, the harm that section
1001(a)(2) false statements have caused is a slight amount of
the entirety of the film (which lasts longer than one hour), we believe that the
avuncular Welles is on our side and is therefore not deceiving us. F FOR FAKE
(Speciality Films 1975).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).
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government delay, at best, and an expenditure of a relatively small
amount of assets, at worst. Thus, by punishing someone for a false
statement when no government agent was deceived is more akin
to punishing someone for attempted speeding, or attempted
operation of a restaurant without the proper licensing. The
attempt itself causes no harm, and the act, if brought to fruition,
will most likely cause little or no harm.
In the case of the unlicensed restaurant owner, moreover, the
harm would come not from having no license, but from serving
rotten food and making patrons sick.
This illuminates the
criticism of many commentators that section 1001(a)(2) is used
only when another underlying charge cannot be proven. If a
department of health cannot prove that a restaurant served bad
food, it may still nab the restaurant owner by proving that he had
no license. In the restaurant industry, the penalty will be minor;
in the world of section 1001(a)(2), however, a defendant could
receive up to five years of incarceration, 211 simply because the
prosecution could not prove the underlying charge.
Is this
something we want to make criminal? Or, rather, should we
consider the mindset of the hearer to determine whether the false
statement actually caused any harm?
The restaurant example shows the importance of the
government agent's mindset and suggests that it should be
considered. If the agent knows a particular statement is a lie, for
example, that lie should not be material (even though a number of
courts have held otherwise).
Such a lie is not capable of
influencing the agent, so it causes no harm.
In addition,
criminalizing such a lie serves no purpose. It does not protect a
government function, and it does not deter would-be liars because
a liar can never know which of his lies are known to an agent and
which are not. Excluding such lies from section 1001(a)(2)'s
coverage may actually have benefits. It would narrow section
1001(a)(2)'s application, which would reduce systemic costs
associated with criminal prosecutions and increase the criminal
law's perceived legitimacy among the populace.
(2) Should the fact that lying is prevalent in society, and
especially in the criminaljustice system, play a part in reforming
or evaluating section 1001(a)(2)? The simple answer may be that if
you think lying to a government agent is wrong, then the fact that
it is widespread should not be a factor to consider. If it is
considered, does that mean that we allow the prevalence of wrong
behavior in society to lessen the penalties associated with that
behavior? In other words, if everyone does it, it cannot be wrong

211. A defendant may receive eight years if the false statement involves
domestic or international terrorism. Id.
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(or illegal). It is not, however, always the role of the criminal law
to punish all wrong conduct since people disagree as to what
constitutes wrong conduct. Because we live in a pluralistic society
with competing notions of right and wrong, we cannot rely solely
on the notion of moral condemnation in formulating the criminal
law. We must also consider what structure of law maximizes
society's safety, happiness, and efficient functioning. This is one
reason that alcohol is not illegal, and that the speed limit for
automobiles is x m.p.h., when a speed limit of less-than-x m.p.h.
would reduce accidents, deaths, and pollution. The fact that lying
is everywhere should play a part in evaluating section 1001(a)(2)'s
propriety; lying does not become right because everyone does it,
but it does become less subject to effective and fair policing. We lie
in most situations to some degree; it has become a habit,
reinforced by politicians who deceive, 212 television sitcoms that
celebrate the little white lie, and realpolitik shows like 24 that
treat deception as an unsavory, but acceptable, means to a good
end.
The fact that law enforcement officers and prosecutors
routinely use lying in police work should provide a further basis to
evaluate section 1001(a)(2).
The law gives privileges to law
enforcement officers: it provides for more serious penalties where
the victim of an assault and battery is an officer, it allows officers
to carry firearms, and it allows officers to stop citizens under
certain circumstances, search them and occasionally detain them.
We do not question these privileges because we acknowledge that
they are necessary in order for officers to carry out their duties.
When assaulting an officer, observing a firearm on the side of an
officer, or being stopped, the officer's privilege and purpose are
apparent. There is no deception involved; the rules of the game
are clear. Lying, however, is different. When an officer lies, the
purpose is to deceive a citizen, perhaps to elicit a confession, or go
undercover with a false identity. By so doing, the rules of the
interaction between the state and the citizen are changed in favor
of the state, and the citizen is left unaware of the rules change.
Why should the citizen be prohibited from using the same tactic
that the state uses? We may allow law enforcement officials
special privileges to carry out their duties, but these privileges are
usually clear and well advertised. Everyone knows, for example,
about Miranda warnings and search warrants. When government
lies, government changes the rules of the game and, unbeknownst
to citizens, tips the balance of power in its favor. Do we want a
system that allows the government that level of power over

212. The State of Washington has even apparently given its politicians a
First Amendment right to lie. Haltom, supra note 161.
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citizens, without citizens having the right to return the favor?
We may, because perhaps we want to give law enforcement
the additional privilege of lying to us, so that crime can be
detected and prevented. To decide this, however, there needs to be
an open debate. Presently, most people are not aware of section
1001(a)(2)'s prohibitions.
Most people know from popular
entertainment such as the television show Law and Order that
cops lie; but they also know from the same entertainment that
suspects and criminal defense attorneys also lie. On these shows,
no one is ever charged with making a false statement, leaving the
popular impression of the criminal justice system as a game in
which lying by both the cat and mouse are accepted practices. If
we as a society are to decide that section 1001(a)(2) is a good law,
we need to know about it. Most of us do not.
(3) Should a section 1001(a)(2) defendant have any excuses
available for a defense? If so, what might these excuses be? In
discussing four principles in favor of lying, Bok suggests excuses
as well. 21 3 First, she advances the principle of avoiding harm. 214 A
possible excuse could therefore be that one made a false statement
in order to avoid harm. This is problematic, however, because the
harm to be avoided in making a false statement to a government
agent will usually be avoiding an admission of guilt, liability for a
claim, or some other harm that society generally thinks the liar
deserves. If false statements are to be generally prohibited, such
statements should not be excused if they are used, for example, to
avoid a required payment of taxes or exposure for a crime she
committed. 215
Bok then advances the principle of production of a benefit. 216
Again, if false statements are to be illegal, then lies told to gain a
benefit should not be excused. This is so because if one has to lie
to gain the benefit, one is virtually always not entitled to that
benefit. Bok's third and fourth principles, those of ensuring
fairness and promoting veracity, tie into her second principle and
suggest that they are rarely, in reality, principles with traction. 217
Consider a person who is owed a benefit such as Social Security.
He needs to produce medical documentation to prove his disability,
but this documentation was destroyed in a hospital fire. He has a
capability of forging this documentation. The question is not
whether he should be allowed to do so, because this situation

213. BOK, supra note 193 at 76, 84.
214. Id. at 76.
215. This latter "excuse" was contained in the now-extinct "exculpatory no"
doctrine, in which one's denial of guilt of a crime that she did in fact commit
was not sanctionable under section 1001(a)(2). Brogan, 522 U.S. at 398.
216. BOK, supra note 193, at 76.
217. Id.
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virtually never arises. Documents are lost, but there is almost
always a way to petition the government for benefits owed in such
cases. Furthermore, crafting a statutory excuse to cover such rare
situations would be exceedingly difficult and would only contribute
to section 1001(a)(2)'s vagueness and confusion. Finally, no
opinion concerning section 1001(a)(2) prosecutions considers such
false statements in the service of truth. All are meant to deceive
and not to promote fairness or veracity. Nevertheless, the lies that
are told in order to deceive occupy a continuum, from very serious
and harmful lies to mild deceptions that cannot cause any harm.
Bok's four principles and the factors she uses to evaluate lies
suggest the types of statements that may be on this continuum.
As discussed, Congress clearly intended some lies ("material"
ones) to be covered under section 1001(a)(2) and some lies not to be
covered. Court interpretation of the statute, however, has gone
beyond congressional intent, and now nearly every false statement
may be actionable. Should this be so? It seems that there are six
types of lies of varying seriousness. In order of most serious (and
least justifiable) to least serious (and most justifiable), they are:
(1) lies that harm another person or entity; (2) lies that benefit the
liar; (3) lies that benefit another person or entity; (4) lies that
avoid harm to the liar; (5) lies that harm the liar; and (6) lies that
are designed to avert harm to another person or entity. Under
current section 1001(a)(2) interpretation, all of these types of lies
may be actionable. Based on some moral viewpoints as well as
practical legal theory, at least some of these types of lies should
not be criminalized.
If the role of criminal law is both to express and encourage
societal norms as well as structure society to maximize its
happiness, safety, and efficiency, then lies (2) through (5) should
be celebrated, not criminalized. If a lie provides a benefit to
anyone andlor reduces a harm for anyone, then it should initially
be encouraged. 218 Of course, lies have collateral negative effects
that often outweigh the immediate positive effects. For example, if
Eric knows where a murderer is hiding, Eric can help him avoid
the harm of incarceration by lying to the police. The murderer's
harm is avoided by the lie, but society's harm is increased because
it continues to live in fear, and another person may die at the
murderer's hands.
Balancing the many and diffuse effects of lying is often
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, and so the use of this
continuum in evaluating lies is limited. It can, however, be used
to better effect in evaluating what lies should be criminal and
what lies should not be. This is so because most criminal laws,
218. Sissela Bok and Emmanual Kant would disagree.
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especially those with such severe penalties as section 1001(a)(2)
has, have a requisite mens rea. The specific intent currently
required by section 1001(a)(2) is the knowing and willful making of
a false statement. The liar's purpose in making that statement is
irrelevant. The continuum of lies set forth above suggests that it
For example, consider a criminal
should not be irrelevant.
investigation into whether Stacey intentionally provided tainted
blood to a blood bank in order to harm the recipient of the blood.
Investigators come to the home of Stacey's friend and ask the
friend whether he is aware that Stacey has HIV/AIDS. The friend
believes that this information is private, does not want to disclose
this sensitive fact to anyone, and so tells the investigatorsfalsely-that his friend does not have HIV/AIDS. The friend is
unaware that the investigators believe Stacey is guilty of
intentionally providing tainted blood in order to harm a blood
donee.
Stacey's friend knowingly and willfully made a false
statement. His purpose in doing so was, in fact, to deceive, but it
was to protect his friend from what he thought was intrusive and
unjustified questioning. The friend intended to help Stacey avoid
harm, and he was unaware that by doing so, he might increase
any harm to society that would come with the failure to bring
Stacey to justice. The friend's purpose in lying was not to allow or
increase the level of harm to society. One can imagine a false
statements act that differentiates false statements based on the
statement-maker's purpose in lying.
This hypothetical situation suggests another way to evaluate
lies, which would be to look at the nature of the question posed by
the governmental agent. Is the question merely regulatory in
nature ("How many tons of garbage did your company process last
month?"), is it accusatory ("Where were you last night at 10
p.m.?"), is it personal ("Do you frequent any local gay bars?"), or is
it possibly protected by privacy rights ("Do you have any diagnosed
medical conditions?"). Although section 1001(a)(2) legitimately
focuses on the effect of a lie on the government and not the nature
of the lie itself, it should not necessarily do so. There are a
number of situations in which the government is limited in
achieving its legitimate goals in order to protect citizens' rights.
Officers must have probable cause to obtain a search warrant and
no confession is admissible if made in a custodial interrogation
absent the giving of Miranda warnings.
allows
1001(a)(2)
The fact, moreover, that section
interviewees to either speak the truth or remain silent is often an
illusory choice. If the government agent's question is "Do you have
HIV/AIDS," or "Do you possess any illegal guns or drugs," an
interviewee's silence will usually be taken as an admission. This
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is especially so when the agent sets up the question by first asking
a number of innocuous questions, to which the interviewee readily
provides truthful answers. Silence in response to that last, crucial
question then speaks volumes. Section 1001(a)(2) pretends that
all lies are created equal. They are not; they vary in their nature
and seriousness, and a law designed to treat them all the same is
an unwise law.
Lying is a complex form of communication that is deeply
embedded in every interaction in our society. It may not be
considered lying, but rather "purposeful communication," or it may
be an intentional fabrication designed to obtain some benefit for
oneself. Section 1001(a)(2) is a black-and-white law that attempts
to deal with a multicolor phenomenon. As such, it fails more often
than it passes the public policy test. It fares no better when
viewed through the lens of criminal law theory.
VII. CRIMINAL LAW THEORY

Whatever the underlying bases for judicial opinions are,
federal judges virtually never refer to criminal law theory in
rendering decisions. 219 Legislatures and politicians, for their part,
rarely apply criminal law theory, preferring instead a "tough on
crime" approach designed to ensure re-election. 220 Despite the
apparent inapplicability of criminal law theory, a discussion of it is
important for at least two reasons. First, criminal law theory can
help us evaluate section 1001(a)(2) in light of what we believe is
the right way to go about criminally accusing, trying, and
punishing people. Second, theory does play a role in construction
of the criminal law, even if theory is comprised only of the
rationales for punishment and the requirement that a defendant
be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 221 This Article cannot
hope to relate fully the vast, controversial, and often contradictory
field of criminal law theory; the goal is just to touch on a few
central themes and place section 1001(a)(2) within them.
Criminal law theory may encompass a technical discussion of
detailed doctrines, more abstract notions of a general framework,

219. A WestLaw search for "criminal law theory" or "theory of criminal law"
returned just eleven federal opinions. Only two of these opinions are of note
for the purposes of this Article, and those two are notable only tangentially.
220. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J.
571, 595 (2005); Stephen Reinhardt, Weakening the Bill or Rights: A Victory
for Terrorism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 963, 965 (2008); Jeffrey S. Jacobi, Note,
Mostly Harmless:An Analysis of Post-AEDPA Federal Habeas Corpus Review
of State Harmless Error Determinations, 105 MICH. L. REV. 805, 812 n.49
(2007).
221. United States v. Fox, 473 F.2d 131, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States
v. Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. 168, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).

2009]

A CriticalAnalysis of the Federal False Statements Act

149

or a historical analysis of the development of the law. 222 It could
consist of what the criminal law is, or what it should be. 223 There
may be no coherent theory of criminal law, 224 or theory might
intertwine with chance and multivalent interests to produce the
law as we know it.225 What one's focus is, whether one is
descriptive or idealistic, and the degree to which one believes in
consistency or randomness depends largely on one's subjective
reference point. 226 This may be so because criminal law theory is a
new area of study, 227 and we have not yet had time to establish an
objective theory of criminal law that is consistent and substantial.
Where can we situate section 1001(a)(2) in this inchoate field of
study?
This Article has discussed the history of section 1001(a)(2)
It has
and the details of its construction and application.
determined what the law is as interpreted by courts and what it is
supposed to be based on congressional intent and some other
courts' interpretations. We ought now to pull back and attempt to
place section 1001(a)(2) in a wider theoretical framework. In doing
so, it is tempting to eschew the notion that there is no consistent
criminal law theory, and that one can say little of the structure of
criminal law. 228 The possibility that there is no theory of criminal
law, however, is where we must begin.
Justin Miller said in 1934 that the development of the
criminal law was inconstant, "highly fortuitous," and "frankly one
of blundering along from case to case and hoping gradually to
achieve certainty."229 Alan Norrie has written more recently that
the "'criminal law is neither rational nor principled': we cannot
even aspire to 'a rational and principled criminal law', because
legal reasoning is 'necessarily contradictory."' 230 Gerald Leonard
wrote that "[i]n every period . .. the criminal law has been
222. Nicola Lacey, Philosophy, History and Criminal Law Theory, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 295, 300 (1998).

223. R.A. Duff, Theorizing Criminal Law: A 25th Anniversary Essay, 25
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 354 (2005).
224. Id. at 357 (quoting ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY 7, 10

(2d ed.)); Justin Miller, Criminal La-An Agency for Social Control, 43 YALE
L.J. 691, 698, 702 (1934).
225. Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory:
Culture and Doctrinefrom Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 691, 735 (2003).
226. Lacey, supranote 222, at 303.

227. George P. Fletcher, Criminal Theory in the Twentieth Century, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 265, 266 (2001); George P. Fletcher, The Nature
and Functionof Criminal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 687, 687, 689 (2000).

228. Lacey, supra note 222, at 322.
229. Miller, supra note 224, at 702.
230. Duff, supra note 223, at 357 (quoting ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON
AND HISTORY 7, 10 (2d ed.)).
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multivalent, not defined or limited by any master principle but
buffeted and manipulated by chance, by interest, by social needs,
as well as by theory."231 Jerome Hall believed that the practice of
criminal law has driven the theory, such that theory is directed to
make sense of every provision of law. 232
Section 1001(a)(2) seems to fit well into this theory of criminal
law. At its birth, section 1001(a)(2) was a law that was limited to
protecting the government against a distinct and real threat to the
financial well-being of the government. Fraudulent war benefits
claims were a real problem, and Congress passed section
1001(a)(2)'s precursor to address this specific problem. There was
no attempt to protect a large swath of federal agencies through the
law. The New Deal brought with it countless new federal
agencies, most of which regulated society in one way or another
but were not involved with financial transactions. The law was
amended to address this new reality. Again, the law was altered
to address a real issue in society; it was driven by chance and
need, not theory. As the twentieth century progressed, section
1001(a)(2) came to be interpreted more and more broadly. The
latter half of the twentieth century saw the increased
criminalizaton of society, 233 and section 1001(a)(2)'s increasing
breadth reflected that. We arrive at the twenty-first century, in
which the federal prison population has increased over 700% in
the last thirty years, 234 and section 1001(a)(2), as interpreted, can
conceivably cover virtually any false statement. Section 1001(a)(2)
seems to be the embodiment of an atheoretical criminal law that
depends not on theory but on changing political needs.
And yet, the American system of laws-criminal as well as
civil-seems quite stable and consistent. Due process rights are
well-established, convicted defendants have access to appeals and
the right to an attorney, and the citizenry supports all three
branches of government. Certainly, there is injustice in the
system, but the system has proven to be remarkably adept at
evolving and remaining powerful. Wouldn't such a system be
based on a consistent theory, however unstated?
Although people disagree, it is generally accepted that the
criminal law operates on both a moral and functional level. When
it operates on a moral level, it morally condemns the criminal for
her act, and it also communicates that condemnation to the

231. Leonard, supra note 225, at 735.
232. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 13 (The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2d ed. 1960).
233. Bak-Boychuk, supra note 2, at 479.
234. Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and
the Futureof Mass Incarceration,57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 857 (2009).
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public. 235
When it operates on a functional level, it is an
institution whose job it is to achieve some benefit for society. For
example, it may operate to maximize the dominion of individual
people, 236 promote societal efficiency, 237 support the individual's
contract with the state, 238 or address the public's need to prevent
certain harms that touch society and individuals. 239 A middle
ground that covers both the moral and functional operations is the
norms approach. The norms approach reflects the law's moral
operation because it seeks both to publicize society's norms as well
as enforce them. 240 It is also a supposedly value-free approach
that seeks to manipulate norms to reach certain behavioral goals
in order to increase efficiency in society. 241
Section 1001(a)(2) seems to operate as a functional law
because its goal is to promote the efficient and cost-effective
running of the government: the victim of a section 1001(a)(2)
violation is usually subjected to speedy and certain government
action. As a functional law, does it work?
Does it operate to maximize the dominion of individual
people? In other words, does section 1001(a)(2) work to increase
people's liberty while not detracting from anyone else's liberty?
Based on the court opinions that have considered section
1001(a)(2), the answer seems to be that it does not. At worst, it
delayed or frustrated a governmental operation. Courts'
interpretation of section 1001(a)(2) takes us further away from
fulfilling this functional goal; if a false statement can be criminal
even if there is no way the government would rely on it, there is
absolutely no liberty interest at stake.
Does section 1001(a)(2) operate to promote societal efficiency?
Perhaps. If we assume that governmental efficiency supports
societal efficiency and that governmental efficiency is increased
when it receives truthful information, then section 1001(a)(2)
promotes governmental and societal efficiency. The efficiency
argument, however, is the Posnerian economic theory of law. If we
unpack this theory a bit, section 1001(a)(2) no longer fares so well.
Posner writes that the main function of the criminal law "is to
prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary,
235. Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Communicating Moral Responsibility
Through Criminal Law, 26 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 210, 212 (2006).
236. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A
REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 54 (Oxford University Press 1990).
237. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1194-95 (1985).
238. Leonard, supra note 225, at 710-12.
239. Id. at 773-74.
240. Robert Weisberg, Norms and CriminalLaw, and the Norms of Criminal
Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 485 (2003).
241. Id. at 474.
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compensated exchange-the 'market,' explicit or implicit-in
situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is
a more efficient method of allocating resources than forced
exchange." 242 Posner categorizes crimes into "acquisitive crimes"
and "crimes of passion," 243 and then offers five sub-categories: (1)
wealth-shifting crimes, like tax evasion; (2) voluntary exchanges of
value, like prostitution; (3) menacing but unsuccessful acts like
attempted murder; (4) "conduct that if allowed would thwart other
forms of common law or statutory regulation," like bribing judges;
and (5) blackmail and certain other forms of private law
enforcement that are made criminal. 244
False statements made in the course of committing another
crime, or false statements intended to circumvent regulations fall
into Posner's category of crimes that would thwart other forms of
common law or statutory regulation. For example, if a sewage
treatment plant falsely reports its discharges into a local river to
the EPA, as it is required to do, it will be able to run a cheaper
company, with greater profits, because it bypasses an aspect of the
market in sewage treatment. This would thus be an acquisitive
crime. Many section 1001(a)(2) false statements, however, do not
result and are not intended to result in any acquisition or
circumvention of common law or regulation.
Furthermore,
because section 1001(a)(2) does not take into account the hearer's
mindset, it prohibits behavior beyond that which thwarts common
law or regulation. This is so because section 1001(a)(2) prohibits a
false statement even if the hearer knows it is false and thus does
not rely on it, or even if the hearer never receives or could not rely
on the statement. Such false statements cannot thwart any law or
regulation. False statements, as Bok and others have noted, are
complex things. People lie for all sorts of reasons, including
altruistic reasons. A number of false statements mentioned
throughout this article simply do not fit Posner's model.
Does section 1001(a)(2) promote the individual's contract with
the state? For Blackstone, "society was a matter of contract
among a mass of individuals who had chosen to leave the 'state of
nature' in preference for collective living. . . ." 245 However, when
an individual removed himself from the state of nature, he
essentially gave a legislating body the power to enact law to secure
the development of ever complex property law. 246
Thus, every person had "obligated her- or himself to the

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Posner, supra note 237, at 1195.
Id. at 1196-97.
Id. at 1199-1200.
Leonard, supra note 225, at 710.
Id. at 711.
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cultivation of a public character under positive law." 24 7 For
Blackstone, there was "an imperative that one always attend to
the public." 248
Section 1001(a)(2) is problematic under Blackstone's
formulation. First, a contract with the state implies bargained-for
exchange of value. In exchange for the truth, what do citizens
subject to section 1001(a)(2)'s prohibitions receive? They do not
receive a requirement that the government tell the truth in return.
This is especially so in the field of law enforcement. They are
supposed to receive a more efficient government because that
government operates on true information and not false
statements. Certainly one's "public character" would consist in
part of playing a positive role in one's government, either to
support it or reform it. False statements should play no part in
either of these endeavors. Perhaps, then, what one receives from
the government through section 1001(a)(2) is encouragement-or
coercion-to do the right thing and not lie to the government.
Given the prevalence of lying in society today, this encouragement
has been an apparent failure.
As it stands today, section 1001(a)(2) does not further the goal
of supporting the government. It could be amended to promote
this goal and reduce the likelihood of its abuse as a "gotcha"
statute. For example, section 1001(a)(2) could require a warning
to be given to all citizens who are questioned by government
agents. 249 This would inform people of the legal requirement
either to tell the truth or remain silent. Government agents would
then be more likely to receive the truth or nothing at all, and
would thus be less likely to be duped by a citizen's false statement.
This would increase governmental efficiency and provide the
collateral benefit of greater legitimacy to the government because
of the increased transparency of the law. Section 1001(a)(2) is a
good, but flawed, start, and can be amended to satisfy Blackstone's
formulation.
Does section 1001(a)(2) promote societal and individual
safety? As noted above, no judicial opinion has been found in
which a defendant's false statement led to society or any
individual being less safe. Certainly one can conceive of a foreign
or domestic terrorist who slips through national security with the
use of a well-executed false statement and who then is able to
detonate a bomb that kills a number of people. It appears thus
far, however, that where national security has thwarted such
attempts, it has not relied on section 1001(a)(2) to do so. In such a

247. Id. at 712.
248. Id. at 719.
249. Birch, supra note 2, at 1288.
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situation, furthermore, it is doubtful that the American public
would be satisfied if the government had to rely on section
1001(a)(2) to punish the terrorist. The terrorist, finally, would
probably not be deterred by the existence of section 1001(a)(2).
The discussion above calls into question the theoretical
It should not, however, be
validity of section 1001(a)(2).
understood to condemn the law. Reasonable people will see in
section 1001(a)(2) an important tool for prosecutors to ensure our
interest in effective and efficient government. Whether this goal
calls for the criminalization of false statements is another
question. Some false statements amount to financial fraud on the
government-theft, essentially-and are more like traditional
crimes than, say, lying when the F.B.I. comes to your door asking
about your best friend. Some conduct that section 1001(a)(2)
prohibits should be criminal, and some should not. What, then, do
we do with this law?
VIII. SOLUTIONS

Section 1001(a)(2) is problematic in part because it is
intended to address an important governmental interest, but does
so in a vague, overbroad way that does not respect citizens'
interests in a reasonably limited criminal law with notice as to
what that law is. There are possible solutions to this problem
based on the theory that the criminal law ought to operate to
maximize the safety, stability, and efficiency of society. Because
section 1001(a)(2) has not been shown to increase or decrease the
level of safety, we should consider its role in promoting stability
and efficiency. First, a note on the meaning of "stability" and
''efficiency."
The term "stability," means that the law should promote
consistent, transparent, and predictable operation of society.
Societies tend to work better when everyone knows the rules and
knows that the rules in effect today will probably be in effect
tomorrow. If the rules change, the imperative of transparency
requires that people be notified of the change and given the
opportunity to weigh in on it.
The term "efficiency" means that the law should promote the
speedy and cost-effective operation of society while retaining an
adequate level of protection or, in other words, due process. An
efficient society does not spend money, resources, or time on
procedures or institutions that do not provide some adequate
benefit in return. 250
250. This theory I propose does not include a place for moral condemnation.
This is not to say that I do not believe that moral condemnation should play a
part in the criminal law. Although I am more sympathetic to the notion of the
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The most radical solution to the problem of section 1001(a)(2)
is either for courts to reinterpret or Congress to amend section
1001(a)(2) such that it accords with congressional intent. This
Article has focused in large part on determining what that intent
is. It has also, however, suggested that such a revision will
probably not be forthcoming, at least from the courts. If only
because Congress has not acted yet, it is also doubtful that a
legislative resolution is forthcoming. If it were to do so, however,
it should focus on narrowing the definition of materiality, which is
now extraordinarily loose. 251 Congress should do this because it
added the materiality requirement in 1996 in order to limit the
application of section 1001(a)(2) to only some false statements,
only to see subsequent courts interpret the word to mean virtually
any lie. The materiality standard is a good focal point because it
can provide real limits to section 1001(a)(2)'s coverage in a way
that retains the statute's legitimate prohibitions.
Congress could also limit the objective circumstances under
which a section 1001(a)(2) prosecution could be brought. 252
Congress could require, for example, that only statements
voluntarily and positively initiated by a defendant to a
government agent be covered. This would exclude all statements
made in response to interviews initiated by the government. This
solution would prove to be quite difficult, however, because of the
myriad factual situations in which one would make a false
statement.
For example, assume that the I.R.S. initiates an
interview with a person, in order to perform an audit on his tax
return. The person claims he is unemployed, when in fact he
earns money under the table. This false statement, even though
made in a government-initiated interview, seems to fall into the
core category of false statements Congress intended to criminalize.
William J. Schwartz offers another legislative revision as a
solution, one that would address only the criminal investigation
context. 253 His solution would be to distinguish false statements
made during a criminal investigation from other false
statements. 254 This solution would likely protect only suspects,
and not witnesses, because the revision would focus on the intent
of the declarant, and would generally exclude exculpatory

criminal law as a maximizer of the social good rather than an
norms or morals, morality obviously plays a part in criminal
however, that section 1001(a)(2) seems intended solely to protect
of the government, I do not here discuss questions of morality.
left for another day.
251. Morgan, supra note 2, at 234.
252. Id. at 235.
253. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 328-30.
254. Id. at 328.

expression of
law. Given,
the operation
That topic is
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responses because they are "protective and there is a clear
potential for police abuse." 255 When the interviewee has been
informed of the possibility of prosecution under section 1001(a)(2),
section 1001(a)(2) should still cover any false statements he
makes.256
Although drawing a distinction between statements made in
the course of a criminal investigation and those made in other
contexts is a good idea, Schwartz' solution still reflects a
superficial solution to a complex factual situation. For example,
why exclude false statements by suspects and not witnesses? If
someone lies in order to "protect" his friend, would that person be
criminally liable? Furthermore, the line between a civil and
criminal investigation can often be hard to discern. An I.R.S.
audit is a civil procedure, but can easily evolve into a criminal
investigation. For section 1001(a)(2) purposes, when would this
evolution be deemed to happen?
Beyond a radical revision of section 1001(a)(2), the most
immediate suggestion is to require federal agents to give citizens a
warning before interviews regarding their duty to tell the truth or
remain silent. 257 One commentator has suggested, based on
Justice Ginsburg's Brogan concurrance, that a warning might
actually be required to sustain a section 1001(a)(2) conviction. 258
Whether legally necessary or not, a warning would have
substantial benefits. First, it would further section 1001(a)(2)'s
purpose to increase the amount of truthful information being given
to the government. If someone being interviewed by a federal
agent is considering the option of lying, a warning will alert her to
her criminal liability should she choose to do so. She will be less
likely to lie, and the government will be spared the burden of
dealing with a false statement. She may, of course, remain silent,
which the government should prefer to a false statement. By
cutting down on false statements, furthermore, fewer defendants
exist to clog up the judicial system. Warnings also increase the
perceived fairness of the system by providing greater
transparency. On the other hand, if warnings decrease the
number of false statements, they also decrease the opportunity for
federal agents to gain leverage over someone to become an
informant or to obtain a section 1001(a)(2) conviction when they
are unable to prove another, more substantial, offense. These,
however, are not the goals of section 1001(a)(2), and so should not
be considered. 259
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 329.
Id.
Birch, supra note 2, at 1288.
God, supra note 3, at 874.
Section 1001(a)(2) warnings might be compared to Miranda warnings. I
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Finally, Congress could amend section 1001(a)(2) to provide
for a recantation defense. At least one of the federal perjury
statutes provides such a defense, albeit in very limited
circumstances. 260 Congress would have to clearly delineate when
the defense applies. For example, the defense might apply if the
defendant recanted and informed the proper governmental agency
of his false statement and told the truth before the agency had an
opportunity to rely on the statement. Alternately, the defendant
might have to take these steps before the agency actually worked
to its demonstrable detriment based on the original false
statement. This solution, if properly worked out, would increase
governmental efficiency by providing it with more truthful
information, and would provide a way for citizens to repair their
wrong behavior and thus avoid criminal liability. It would be a
humane addition to the law that would also serve section
1001(a)(2)'s purpose in a well-run government.

IX. CONCLUSION
At its base, section 1001(a)(2) means well. Stephen Michael
Everhart is generally correct: people should tell the truth because
it does save the government time and money. People should also
refrain from assault, rape, and murder because these things hurt
other people. Everhart's admonition is, however, overly simplistic
because lying is not like assault, rape, or murder. Lying comes in
many shades, from those told for personal monetary gain to those
told to prevent harm coming to a loved one. Everyone "lies." Some
false statements are part of "purposive communication," in that to
achieve certain goals of communication, literal deception must be
used in the service of the truth. Lies usually do not produce the
level of harm generally associated with the criminal law. Section
1001(a)(2) is more akin to a regulatory law than a criminal law.
Thus, Everhart's admonition is parallel to a warning that
"everyone should be completely honest on their tax forms," and if
they claim $6,000 in deductions when they actually only had
$3,000, they deserve up to five years in prison.
What, then, do we do with a law that means well, but also
covers virtually every false statement made, however minor?
have written elsewhere that Miranda warnings do not work to truly inform
suspects of their rights. Steven R. Morrison, Toward a New Confessions Test:
Replacing Voluntariness with Power, 3 INT'L J. PUNISHMENT & SENT'G 85
(2007). If section 1001(a)(2) warnings were required to be given, it might
emerge that people would make false statements at rates similar to those
before warnings were required. Answering this is probably not possible at this
point, and it is certainly not the subject of this Article.
260. Linda Harrison, The Law of Lying: The Difficulty of PursuingPerjury
Under the FederalPerjuryStatutes, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 397, 400, 422 (2003).
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Section 1001(a)(2) seems to be void for vagueness, but courts have
repeatedly upheld it and interpreted it ever more broadly over its
history. Congress' attempts to limit it have been unsuccessful, and
there seems to be no impetus to amend it. The law doesn't satisfy
its analysis in light of public policy or criminal law theory.
What needs to be done probably will not be done. Congress
ought to reevaluate section 1001(a)(2) with some assumptions in
mind. The first assumption is that courts will interpret any false
statements act broadly, so Congress ought to be very clear in any
revision it makes. This clarity could come through explicit
statements of intent in the Congressional Record. Second, lying is
a many-colored thing. The statements that may be considered lies
range widely in terms of seriousness, nature, and intent. Any
revision of section 1001(a)(2) ought to acknowledge this. It should
also acknowledge that deception is a part of our culture, especially
our criminal justice culture, and is, in many contexts, a necessary
function of communication. Third, the focus of any revision must
be on what lies are to be covered, and what lies are not to be
covered. Congress should look to the history of section 1001(a)(2)
and its own legislative history to determine this. Congress should
also examine the public policy ramifications of a revision. Finally,
section 1001(a)(2) is a functional, not moral, law. It seeks to
enhance the operation of government rather than morally
condemn. Its great breadth, however, and the fact that it prohibits
conduct that most of us consider at a gut-level to be morally wrong
suggest that its passage and interpretation are based in part on
moral ground. Although moral condemnation should not, as a
rule, be excluded from the criminal law, a statute that is meant to
promote the efficient functioning of government should not be
tainted by moral considerations that are neither acknowledged nor
well thought out. It is as though a criminal law prohibited all
expulsion of harmful emissions from coal power plants because it
is morally wrong to pollute.
The purpose of section 1001(a)(2) is to maximize the safety,
stability, and efficiency of government and, by extension, society.
At its base, section 1001(a)(2) has the potential to further these
important goals. Its vagueness, overbreadth, misuse, and lack of
its notice among the populace prevent the accomplishment of these
goals. Congress should act to create a false statements law that
ensures the government's interest in receiving truthful
information but does not criminalize behavior that is widespread,
often accepted, practiced by government law enforcement agents,
and does not harm governmental operations in any way.

